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INTRODUCTION
In January 2001, Larry Ellison, the Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO") of Oracle Corporation, exercised 23 million
stock options for a total gain of more than $706 million.1
Only weeks later, Oracle lowered its earnings forecasts,
initiating a dive in its stock price.2 While the stock traded
for over $30 per share before the announcement-and had
seen prices over $40 per share within the past year-it
dropped to below $20 per share by the end of 2001, and was
around $11 per share at the end of 2002,' dropping almost
twice as fast as the S&P 500 Index.4
From 1996 to 2002, Michael Eisner, the CEO of the
Walt Disney Company, received an average of $123 million
per year in total compensation.5 During that same period,
Disney shareholders received an average annual return of
2%,6 while the S&P 500 Index nearly doubled.7 The stock,
which has seen highs above $40 per share, traded at the
end of 2002 at around $17 per share.'
Examples of compensation packages apparently
divorced from measures of corporate performance did not
end with the popping of the internet stock bubble. In
January of 2002, Jeffrey C. Barbakow, the CEO of Tenet
Healthcare, sold $111 million of the company's stock.9
1. John A. Byrne et al., How to Fix Corporate Governance, Bus. WK., May 6,
2002, at 69, 70.
2. Id.
3. See CNN Money, Five Year Price Chart For Oracle Corporation, at
http://qs.cnnfn.cnn.com/tq/stockquote?symbols=ORCL&gt=5yr (last vistied Sept.
2, 2003).
4. See Yahoo! Finance, S&P 500 Five Year Price Levels, at http://finance.
yahoo.com/q?s=AGSPC&d=c&t=5y&l=on&z=b&q=l (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
5. See Bernard Condon, Collect Now, Deliver Later, FORBES May 13, 2002, at
112, 112.
6. Id.
7. See Yahoo! Finance, S&P 500 Index Price Levels Since 1983, at http:l!
finance.yahoo.com/q?s=AGSPC&d=c&k=cl&a=v&p=s&t=my&l=on&z=m&q=l
(last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
8. See CNN Money, Five Year Index for Walt Disney Company, at http:/qs.
cnnfn.cnn.con/tq/stockquote?symbols=DIS&gt=5yr (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
9. See David Leonhardt, Options Payday: Raking It In, Even as Stocks Sag,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, § 3, at 1.
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Shortly before the sale, Barbakow had described the
corporation's business as "sensational" and increased its
projected earnings.'1 Despite this optimistic forecast, the
company's earnings proved disappointing, and its stock
plunged some 60% over the following year,11 nearly three
times faster than the market as a whole.
12
Examples like these led one commentator to describe
excessive CEO pay as the "mad-cow disease of American
boardrooms."'3 While these stories are at the extreme end of
the scale, they do provide some sense of the magnitude of
the problems with CEO compensation. In 2001, CEOs of
large corporations made 411 times as much as the average
factory worker. 14 In the past ten years, as employee salaries
rose an emaciated 36%, CEO compensation growth
approached 340%, to $11 million.15
Executive compensation is only one example of the
central problem in corporate governance: the separation of
ownership and control in public corporations. 6 While
dispersed, disaggregated shareholders own public corpo-
rations, corporate executives control them. 7 This divergence
of ownership and control opens the door wide to
opportunistic behavior by managers, allowing them to
operate the corporation to serve their own ends rather than
those of the corporation's owners-the shareholders. 8 This
problem runs through most of corporate governance law,
from hostile takeovers 9 to shareholder resolutions 20 to
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Yahoo! Finance, supra note 4.
13. See Byrne et al., supra note 1, at 71.
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id.
16. For a detailed discussion of why the current state of executive
compensation is a serious problem, see infra Part II.
17. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 112-16 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
18. Id. at 116 ("lWihere the bulk of the profits of enterprise are scheduled to
go to owners who are individuals other than those in control, the interests of the
latter are as likely as not to be at variance with those of ownership and ... the
controlling group is in a position to service its own interests.").
19. During a hostile takeover, managers face a strong likelihood of losing
their jobs. Managers may therefore resist hostile takeover attempts even if the
offered price for shareholders' shares includes a large premium over the
preexisting market price. In other words, the split between ownership and
control may lead managers to combat offers that shareholders would prefer the
corporation accept. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
2003] 813
814 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
securing the corporation's obedience to the law.21 Other
factors such as culture, individual psychology, and
particular governance mechanisms also play a role, but the
ownership/control split remains the dominant source of
systematic corporate governance problems.
Proposed solutions to this dilemma broadly fall into two
groups: the free market school and the regulatory school.22
Free market approaches argue that eventually an
unfettered marketplace will solve all apparent governance
problems.23 Participants' enlightened self-interest will cause
the market to demand appropriate solutions, and those
corporations that do not heed this call will fall to Darwinian
selection.24
955 (Del. 1985) ("We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of
shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy when a
threat to control is involved. The directors are of necessity confronted with a
conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult.") (quoting Bennett v.
Propp, 182 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962)).
20. "Under state statutes, shareholders have power only with respect to a
very limited range of matters: amendments of articles of incorporation, mergers,
sales of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets, dissolution, and
election and removal of directors." ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 157 (1999). The shareholders, who own the
corporation, are therefore sharply limited in their legal entitlement to control it.
Id. at 157-58.
21. Directors and officers sometimes cause the corporation to violate the law
in breach of their fiduciary duties to shareholders. See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (explaining that illegal actions by
directors constitute a breach of fiduciary duty owed to shareholders even if the
directors intended to benefit the corporation).
22. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 20, at 113-14 (describing the major
theoretical approaches as the regulatory approach, the management approach,
which favors giving managers wide latitude on the theory that they will be
motivated to act efficiently because their livelihood depends on the corporation's
success, and the law and economics approach). Although Pinto and Branson
divide the free market approach into the management approach and the law
and economics approach, these are not really different approaches. Both involve
the use of rational, financial incentives to motivate managers to act in
shareholders' interests.
23. Id. at 114-16 (describing the law and economics approach). The article
uses the term "free market approach" because law and economics can be used to
justify regulation when there are market failures. See generally Jon D. Hanson
& Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 1163 (1998) (arguing that because
consumers do not internalize the harm that smoking causes them and others-a
market failure-regulation is necessary).
24. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 20, at 115 (explaining that since poor
management may result in the company's failure, the market for managers will
ensure that managers will work efficiently).
SOFTENING PHARAOH'S HEART
Regulatory approaches, on the other hand, contend that
governance problems stem from market failures that must
be corrected by regulation.25 Selfish rational actors may lack
sufficient information, predictive ability, or incentive to
reach the socially optimal result through unmanaged
competition." Moreover, human rationality is bounded,
subject to numerous heuristics and biases that warp
perceptions of which choices are strategically correct.27 As a
result, regulation is sometimes necessary to force the
disclosure of information, to structure appropriate
incentives, or to protect market participants from their own
lapses in rationality.
This article proposes a third mode of analysis for
corporate governance problems: altruistic theory. The free
market school relies on two assumptions about human
behavior: rationality and selfishness.28 The regulatory
school applies research that indicates ways in which the
rationality assumption is fundamentally flawed, attempting
to correct the problems created by these flaws through
regulation.29 Behavioral economists and psychologists have
performed studies that indicate the selfishness assumption
of the free market approach is similarly dubious." This
article takes the first step toward correcting that error by
exploring how and why people behave unselfishly, with the
hope that these studies can be harnessed to promote
unselfish behavior in corporate directors and executives.
The article explores these issues using the case study of
executive compensation, aiming to instill altruism in
25. Id. at 113.
26. See generally id. (stating that the regulatory approach is based on
arguments of unaccountability of managers and market failures).
27. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 14, 14-15 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000) (explaining the notion of bounded rationality).
28. Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker has stated, "[Aill human
behavior can be viewed as involving participants who (1) maximize their utility
(2) from a stable set of preferences and (3) accumulate an optimal amount of
information and other inputs in a variety of markets." Id. at 14 (quoting from
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)). In
an attempt at simplification, this article characterizes narrow utility
maximization (as distinguished from utility functions that incorporate a taste
for altruism) as selfishness, and combines stable preferences and optimal inputs
into a single rationality assumption.
29. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 20, at 113 (explaining that the
regulatory approach points to market failures as a justification for regulation).
30. See infra Part III.
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directors so that they will bargain more forcefully with
executives over their pay.
The notion that altruistic theory has a role to play in
this context seems shocking, especially in light of the
reports in the popular press about recent corporate
excesses.3 Discussing altruism in this context sounds naive.
Yet outside of this arena, most of us would willingly
acknowledge that people behave unselfishly with some
frequency. In fact, we would take as insulting the contrary
position when applied to ourselves. Of course we are not
entirely egoistic, of course we care about the well-being of
others, and of course we often sacrifice our own interests in
order to help those in need. This calm acceptance of
altruism's existence evaporates when discussing the
corporate world, as though directors were something other
than human or checked their personalities at the
boardroom door.
To some extent, this skepticism may actually be
sensible. Competitive corporate cultures may well empha-
size the value of hard-edged reason, disparaging compas-
sion and encouraging narrow, self-interest analysis.
Nevertheless, numerous studies by behavioral economists
and psychologists have documented environmental and
personality factors that foster altruistic behavior." Subjects
31. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jonathan D. Glater, Some Tyco Board
Members Knew of Pay Packages, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at
Al (describing evidence that the board knew of executives' "extravagant pay
packages" despite claiming not to); Kurt Eichenwald, The Findings Against
Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at C1 (explaining that bankruptcy examiner
made preliminary findings that Enron violated public disclosure rules and
pointed out areas of possible fraud with a potential scope of some $1.4 billion);
Byrne et al., supra note 1, at 69 (cover story on the "crisis in corporate
governance"); Leonhardt, supra note 9, at 1 (describing high executive pay
despite sagging performance).
32. See, e.g., C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 109-201 (1991); NANCY EISENBERG, ALTRUISTIC
EMOTION, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR 188-212 (1986); ALFIE KOHN, THE BRIGHTER
SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE: ALTRUISM AND EMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 65-85 (1990);
J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON, ALTRUISM, SOCIALIZATION, AND SOCIETY 38-57 (1980); C.
Daniel Batson & Jay S. Coke, Empathy: A Source of Altruistic Motivation for
Helping?, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY AND
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 167, 171-72, 180-185 (J. Philippe Rushton &
Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1981); Leonard Berkowitz, Social Norms, Feelings,
and Other Factors Affecting Helping and Altruism, in 6 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 63 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1972); Gustavo
Carlo et al., The Altruistic Personality: In What Contexts Is It Apparent?, 61 J.
816 [Vol. 51
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are more willing to assist a person in need when, inter alia,
their perception of that need is clear,33 they believe they
have the capacity to help,34 they empathize with the person
in need,35 helping norms are salient,36 they feel some
responsibility towards the person in need," and they
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 450 (1991); John F. Dovidio, Helping Behavior and
Altruism: An Empirical and Conceptual Overview, in 17 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1984); Harvey
A. Hornstein, The Influence of Social Models on Helping, in ALTRUISM AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds., 1970); Rabindra N. Kanungo
& Jay A. Conger, The Quest for Altruism in Organizations, in APPRECIATIVE
MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP: THE POWER OF POSITIVE THOUGHT AND ACTION IN
ORGANIZATIONS 228-38 (Suresh Srivastva & David L. Cooperrider eds., 1990); M.
Audrey Korsgaard et al., Beyond Helping: Do Other-Oriented Values Have
Broader Implications in Organizations?, 82 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 160 (1997);
Shalom H. Schwartz, Normative Influences on Altruism, in 10 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221, 242-73, (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977);
Shalom H. Schwartz & Judith A. Howard, Internalized Values as Motivators of
Altruism, in DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE MORALITY 229 (Ervin Staub et al.
eds., 1984); Ervin Staub, A Conception of the Determinants and Development of
Altruism and Aggression: Motives, the Self, and the Environment, in ALTRUISM
AND AGGRESSION: BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ORIGINS 135 (Carolyn Zahn-Waxler et
al. eds., 1986).
33. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 75, 83, 225-26; EISENBERG, supra note 32,
at 189-95; Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 73; Kanungo & Conger, supra note 32,
at 253; Schwartz, supra note 32, at 242-45; Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32,
at 232-33; and Staub, supra note 32, at 136.
34. See KOHN, supra note 32, at 75; Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 73;
Schwartz, supra note 32, at 245-46; Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32, at 233.
35. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 47-57 (summarizing theories of, inter alia,
Martin Hoffman, Dennis Krebs, Melvin Lerner, and Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner,
and Clark); Dovidio, supra note 32, at 370-72 (summarizing theories of Batson
and Coke); Staub, supra note 32, at 141-43.
36. See Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 78 ("An increasing number of social
psychological investigations have demonstrated that the sight of a person (the
model) carrying out a paticular action can indeed heighten the onlookers' own
inclination to behave this way themselves."); Hornstein, supra note 32, at 30-31
(explaining that the observation of helpful social models may induce helping
behavior because the model demonstrates how people like the observer are
expected to behave); Staub, supra note 32, at 155 ("There is substantial
evidence that prior participation in prosocial behavior increases adults'
subsequent positive actions .... ).
37. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 186, 191, 199; RUSHTON, supra note 32, at
42-46 (explaining norms of social responsibility that help lead to helping
behavior); Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 72-73 (citing various theorists who
argue that feelings of responsibility help lead to altruistic behavior); Hornstein,
supra note 32, at 29 ("In any given situation it is incumbent upon the person
involved to determine whether the particular situation is one in which he,
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possess high self-esteem and/or an elevated mood. 8 These
results open the door to designing governance institutions
that encourage altruistic behavior, even in the face of
contrary corporate norms of self-interest. Nevertheless,
there do not appear to have been any attempts to apply
such research in designing social institutions for corporate
governance until now.
There may be sharp limits to altruism's ability to blunt
directors' self-interest, particularly in an arena such as
compensation, where executives' opposition can be expected
to be most forceful. 9 Certainly it would be too much to
expect altruism-fostering institutions to energize boards
enough for the newly altruistic boards to eliminate
excessive and poorly structured compensation (much less
all problems stemming from the separation of ownership
and control). But no reform device could pass such a
stringent test in this area. The underlying problem of the
separation between ownership and control is too
fundamental to be susceptible to absolute solutions. Our
expectations for reform mechanisms must be more modest
and practical-to create institutions that ameliorate the
especially, should assume responsibility for another person's welfare.");
Kanungo & Conger, supra note 32, at 253 ("The social psychological literature
on helping behavior and social loafing.., clearly suggests that people engage in
altruistic acts when they perceive the need for such acts and accept
responsibility for them."); Schwartz, supra note 32, at 230 (explaining studies
which show personal norms are unrelated to altruistic behavior among those
who tend to deny responsibility, but correlated among those most likely to
accept responsibility).
38. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 177, 181, 186, 199; EISENBERG, supra note
32, at 201-03 (arguing that the relationship between self-esteem and helping
behavior is complex, but in many situations high self-esteem is associated with
altruism); KOHN, supra note 32, at 72-73 ("[C]ontented people are more likely to
extend themselves to others: the rule is 'feel good, do good.' "); Berkowitz, supra
note 32, at 80-83 (explaining that elevated mood from prior success can
influence helpfulness); Dovidio, supra note 32, at 389-91 ("The results of many
experiments involving a variety of subject populations, research settings, ways
of inducing feelings, and types of helping situations have found that people who
feel good, successful, happy, and fortunate are more likely to help someone else
than are people who are not in a positive state or who feel bad, unsuccessful,
sad, or depressed."); Staub, supra note 32, at 144-45 (suggesting that a
moderately positive self-concept is associated with altruism).
39. See generally Roland N. McKean, Economics of Trust, Altruism, and
Corporate Responsibility, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 29, 42
(Edmund S. Phelps, ed. 1975) (arguing that it is unlikely that altruism could be
harnessed to modify corporate behavior affecting health and the environment).
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symptoms even if they do not affect a cure, at a cost that is
low relative to the benefit provided.
The concept of harnessing altruism to improve
corporate governance is new, even revolutionary." As such,
most of the article is devoted to explaining the problem and
then exploring altruism and its causes, rather than
discussing a specific reform proposal. The concrete proposal
set forth toward the end of the article is intended to initiate
a conversation, not end it. The intent is to stimulate
discussion in a new direction on a very old and important
problem. While the proposal hopefully represents an
important first step toward using altruism to shape
preferences in ways that improve corporate governance, the
true measure of this article's success will be whether it
provokes others also to investigate reforms employing an
altruism-based approach.
Part I of the article discusses the rising problem with
CEO compensation levels and structures. Part II describes
ways in which boards of directors are captured by CEOs,
highlighting the problem of the separation between
ownership and control. Part III outlines different theories
about the root causes of altruism in the psychology,
economics, and sociobiology literature, and discusses
situational factors that help induce altruistic behavior. Part
IV puts forth a proposal for harnessing altruism-the
Random Shareholder Committee-and presents several
potential criticisms of the idea along with responses.
Concluding this article are suggestions of some areas for
future research.
I. THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PROBLEM
This article is premised on the notion that by any
reasonable measure, CEO compensation is both much too
high and poorly structured. This statement begs the
question, what constitutes a reasonable measure?
40. Despite considerable efforts, the author and his research assistant were
unable to find a single published article applying altruistic theory to problems
of corporate governance prior to submission of this article. After submission,
however, such a working article was released on the Social Science Research
Network. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or,
Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), UCLA
School of Law, L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-8, 2003, at http:/!
papers.ssrn.com (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
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Normally, economists turn to the market as a valuation
tool. Markets generally provide the best available indication
of efficient prices, the prices at which goods and services
will be allocated to their most highly-valuing users.41 The
natural question to ask, therefore, is why we cannot depend
on the market in the executive compensation context as we
do in most others. No one seems terribly concerned, for
example, that Tiger Woods or Madonna are overpaid, nor
does anyone complain that their pay is not closely tied to
their performance. Professional athletes have watched their
compensation increase at much faster rates than that of
CEOs. From 1980 to 1995, one study shows that CEO pay
increased by 380%, while worker salaries increased by only
60%.42 That study also indicates, however, that during the
same period, NBA players saw their compensation riseb
640%, NFL players by 800%, and MLB players by 1000%.
Why raise an outcry over CEO pay, but maintain relative
silence over salaries of professional athletes, whose pay has
increased even more?
The important distinction between CEO compensation
and the amount paid for most other services is that there is
no well-functioning market for CEO compensation. For a
market to reflect efficient prices, there must be competition
among self-interested purchasers attempting to secure
goods and services at the lowest cost possible. No such
competition exists in the realm of CEO pay because the
purchaser of the CEO's services-the board of directors-is
aligned in important ways with the CEO. Instead of seeking
the best talent for the least money, the board will often
passively acquiesce to the desires of the current CEO both
as to the CEO's retention and as to the CEO's compensation
package.
41. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 721 (1996)
("[T]hrough the requirement of bargaining, we can be reasonably confident that
property will change hands when and only when the change is efficient. For
example, bargaining can ensure that my car will be transferred to another
person when and only when he values it more highly than I do.").
42. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation,
35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (citing JAY W. LORSCH, COMPENSATING
CORPORATE CEO'S: A PROCESS VIEW fig. II (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper
No. 99-013, 1998)).
43. Id.
44. See infra Part II (analyzing forces pushing toward board passivity).
820 [Vol. 51
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In the absence of a well-functioning market for CEOs'
services, other methods must be sought for evaluating
whether compensation levels are excessive and poorly
structured. In Section A, the article will examine absolute
level and growth rate of CEO salaries, comparisons to
worker salaries, comparisons to the compensation of CEOs
in Europe and Japan, and correlation to performance as
possible measures of appropriate CEO pay level and
structure. In Section B, the article turns to the question of
why policymakers should care about whether CEO pay
packages are efficient. Finally, in Section C, the article
briefly discusses some proposed methods of solving the
executive compensation problem rooted in either the free
market or regulatory schools and argues that these
attempts appear unlikely to achieve their purpose.
A. Is CEO Compensation Excessive?
The level of CEO pay for the largest U.S. corporations
continues to climb at dramatic rates." U.S. CEO com-
pensation is also high relative to their counterparts in
Europe and Japan," despite the fact that formal governance
45. See Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective
Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L. J. 59, 60-61 (1992) (during
the 1980s, CEO compensation increased by 212% while earnings on the S&P
500 Index grew by only 78% and factory workers received only 53% raises); Carl
T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate
Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993) (during the 1980s, CEO compensation
grew 212%); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a
Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 202 (1996) (CEO
compensation rose 20.6% in 1993, 12.8% in 1994, and 10.4% in 1995); Tod Perry
& Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or
Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 123-24 (2000) (total
CEO compensation for all 1900 firms listed in the ExecuComp database more
than doubled from 1992 to 1998, and CEOs from S&P 500 firms' compensation
rose more than 250%).
46. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Compensation of the Chief Executive
Officer and Directors of Publicly Held Corporations, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
INSTITUTE 103, 106-08 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 7-8, 1999), available in
Westlaw, ALI-ABA Database [hereinafter "Eisenberg I'] (explaining that while
U.S. CEOs earn 200 times what factory workers earn, Japanese CEOs earn only
about 20-30 times factory workers' salaries); Melvin A. Eisenberg, A Brief
Overview of the Problems Raised by Executive and Director Compensation, IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES 299, 301-02 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Dec. 11-12, 1997), available in Westlaw, ALI-ABA Database
[hereinafter "Eisenberg II"] ("[T]he evidence suggests that the total
compensation of American CEOs, including base salary, bonus, long-term
2003] 821
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structures in European and Japanese corporations are
broadly similar to those of U.S. corporations and are
arguably converging to the U.S. model.47 Perhaps most
troubling of all, CEO compensation seems poorly correlated
with CEO performance, despite the geometric growth in the
use of "performance-related" compensation in the past
decade.48
compensation and benefits and perquisites, is approximately twice as high as
that of CEOs of comparable corporations in Japan, Germany, eight other west
European countries, and Canada."); Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 4, 6
(explaining that U.S. CEOs appear to be paid more, but executive pay is
difficult to measure outside the U.S.); Loewenstein, supra note 45, at 203
(explaining a 1996 study that showed U.S. CEOs earned an average of
$1,085,000 while average CEOs in Great Britain earned $551,600, in Germany
$537,000, in France $485,004, and in Italy $318,000). In 1990, average U.S.
CEOs earned $2.8 million per year (120 times manufacturing worker's salary)
while their counterparts in Germany earned $735,000 annually (twenty-one
times factory worker's compensation) and CEOs in Japan earned only $310,000
(sixteen times factory worker's salary). Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating:
The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1871 (1992)
(reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)).
47. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 454-59 (2001) (arguing that the major
industrial countries' corporate legal systems are already broadly similar and
are converging).
48. See Barris, supra note 45, at 65-66 (changes in stock prices may have
nothing to do with CEO performance, accounting figures can be manipulated,
and many executives are protected from decreased compensation in bad
economic times); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction In the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 757
(2003) (firms use options that are not indexed to a relevant market and are
therefore unrelated to CEO performance); Bogus, supra note 45, at 12 (citing a
study which shows that while a 10% improvement in corporate profits
correlates with a 24% increase in CEO compensation, a 20% decline corresponds
with a 7.5% increase in CEO compensation, and a 30% decline results in a 6.1%
boost in pay); Mark A. Clawson and Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A
Proposal for Compensation Commensurate With Performance, 3 STAN. J. L. Bus.
& FIN. 31, 32-33 (1997) (recommending indexed options because non-indexed
options are not correlated strictly to management performance); Robert Dean
Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 Hous.
L. REV. 399, 414 (1998) ("[Plerformance and pay do not seem to be strongly
correlated."); Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 891 (1991)
("Recent research reveals a strikingly low correlation between the compensation
of top managers and the economic performance of their companies.");
Loewenstein, supra note 45, at 203-08 (citing a study indicating that the link
between CEO pay and performance is "slight" and arguing that the CEO cannot
take sole credit for any corporate gain); cf Melvin A. Eisenberg, Contractual
Freedom in Corporate Law: Articles & Comments; The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1489-92 (1989) (arguing that while there is a
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But is CEO compensation excessive? We can break the
question down into several components: absolute level and
growth rate, comparisons to worker salaries, comparisons to
the compensation of CEOs in Europe and Japan, and
correlation to performance.
Beginning with absolute levels and growth rates, at the
start of the 1980s, the average CEO earned $624,996. 49
During that decade, CEO pay rose by 212%."° Far from
regressing to the mean after such an increase, during the
past ten years, CEO compensation has skyrocketed by
340%."' As a result, average CEO pay now approaches $11
million per year.52
Such growth rates might not trouble us if they reflected
general prosperity. But worker salaries have consistently
lagged far behind. During the 1980s, while CEO
compensation grew 212%, factory worker salaries rose by
only 53%.53 The past ten years have seen this divide only
widen. As CEOs garnered 340% increases, employees saw
only 36% growth in their wages." As a result, while at the
beginning of the 1980s, CEOs earned roughly 42 times
worker salaries,55 they now make, on average, 411 times
what factory workers make.56
The distortionary effect of the split between ownership
and control on CEO salaries can also be seen in a
comparison to the compensation of CEOs in Europe and
Japan. Iri Europe-especially Germany-and Japan, the
statistical correlation between pay and performance, "the argument that the
interests of managers and shareholders are adequately aligned by executive
compensation is descriptively inaccurate because the dollar amounts involved
are trivial or immaterial"); Perry & Zenner, supra note 45, at 123 (unclear
whether CEO pay is tied to performance); David M. Schizer, Executives and
Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 440 (2000) (discussing the dangers to incentives from hedging
strategies); Yablon, supra note 46, at 1873 (CEO compensation is only slightly
correlated to corporate performance). But see Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives
Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, 64 HARv. Bus. REV. 125, 127 (1986) ("As
measured by the rate of return on common stock, a strong, positive statistical
relationship exists between executive pay and company performance.").
49. See Barris, supra note 45, at 62.
50. Id. at 60.
51. See Byrne et al., supra note 1, at 72.
52. Id.
53. See Barris, supra note 45, at 60-61.
54. See Byrne et al., supra note 1, at 72.
55. See Barris, supra note 45, at 62.
56. See Byrne et al., supra note 1, at 72.
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ownership-control split is far less evident, despite a broad
similarity in formal corporate structures.5 Corporations in
those countries are considerably more dependent on a small
group of banks for their working capital. 8 In contrast, U.S.
corporations rely much more on external capital markets.59
Banks functioning as internal capital sources can exercise
control over their investments by threatening to withhold
additional funds. In addition, European and Japanese
banks and other institutional investors are far more likely
to own large percentages of a single corporation's stock,
enhancing both their incentive and ability to exercise
control."° For example, in Germany, an average of 45% of
outstanding shares in 42 of the largest 100 corporations are
owned by three banks.6 John Coffee has argued that
European and Japanese institutional investors sacrifice
liquidity in exchange for a large measure of control-a
sacrifice U.S. institutional investors have not proven willing
to make62-but as a result institutional investors in Europe
and Japan do achieve a degree of unity between ownership
and control, ameliorating the problems stemming from the
separation of ownership and control.63
Not surprisingly, then, CEO compensation is markedly
lower in Europe and Japan than in the U.S. The results of
one survey indicate that at a time when U.S. CEOs earned
an average of a little over $1 million, CEOs in Germany
earned about $537,000, CEOs in France $485,000, and in
Italy $318,000.64 In 1990, when average U.S. CEO
compensation approximated $2.8 million, Japanese chief
executives earned only an average of $310,000, and German
CEOs took in $735,000 per year.65 These numbers reflected
multiples of average industrial worker salaries in these
57. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 47.
58. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1286-87 (1991).
59. Id.
60. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as
Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance
Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985, 987-89 (1993).
61. Id. at 988 (counting banks' direct stock holdings, the holdings of bank-
operated mutual funds, and the proxy votes of shares held by the banks' stock
brokerage operations).
62. See Coffee, supra note 58, at 1287.
63. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 877-78.
64. See Loewenstein, supra note 45, at 203.
65. See Yablon, supra note 46, at 1871.
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countries of 120 for the U.S., 16 for Japan, and 21 for
Germany.66 More recent studies also indicate that U.S.
CEOs earn about twice as much as their counterparts in
Japan, Germany, and other west European countries, while
industrial workers in the U.S. earn less than workers in
almost all of these nations."
Perhaps these gaps are explainable not only by
differences in ownership/control structures, but also by a
difference in talent. U.S. CEOs might earn their greater
compensation by producing better performance for their
corporations. If so, U.S. shareholders at least would have
little reason to complain.
The numbers, however, do not support the thesis of a
link between ability and compensation. To begin with a few
dramatic examples, in 1999 Michael Eisner of Disney
earned $576 million, Sandy Weill of Citigroup $167 million,
and Douglas Ivester of Coca-Cola $57 million.8 That ear,
while the S&P 500 Index rose approximately 19.5%, the
total shareholder return for Disney declined by 5%, for
Citigroup sank 6.8%, and for Coca-Cola rose only 1.3%."
More general statistics tell a similar story. Graef
Crystal's studies have demonstrated that when cor-
porations do well, CEO pay increases by a multiple of the
corporation's improvement.71 When corporations' fortunes
decline, however, CEO compensation rarely follows suit.72
When a company's profits increase by 10%, CEO pay rises
by an average of 24%.7' But a 20% fall in corporate profits
correlates to an increase of 7.5% in CEO pay.74 Even 30%
declines in profits are accompanied by 6.1% raises for
CEOs. 5 Only when corporate profits collapse by more than
70% do average CEO salaries fall. 76
66. Id.
67. See Eisenberg II, supra note 46, at 301-02.
68. See Eisenberg I, supra note 46, at 106.
69. See E. S. Browning, Driven by Tech Stocks, Nasdaq Has Best Gain of
Any U.S. Market Ever, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2000, at R1.
70. See Eisenberg I, supra note 46, at 106.
71. See Bogus, supra note 45, at 12 (finding a 10% rise in corporate profits
corresponds to a 24% increase in executive compensation).





76. Id. at 12-13.
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Crystal is a famous advocate for corporate reform, but
Kevin Murphy, largely a defender of the current
compensation system, has also found a reluctance to reduce
CEO compensation when corporate fortunes sink. Murphy's
data from 1975-1984 indicated that when a company's stock
price declined over that period an average of 0% to 20% per
year, average CEO compensation still increased by 5.3%
annually.77 Even when a company's stock price fell by an
average of more than 20% per year, CEO pay still increased
by .4%." When share prices rose on average, the increase in
executive compensation was higher, but generally not as
high as the increase in share price: 8.3% when share prices
rose from 0% to 20% annually, 9.6% when share prices rose
an average of 20% to 40% per year, and 13.8% when share
prices skyrocketed by over 40%. TM In sum, executive
compensation seems poorly correlated to important
measures of corporate performance.
B. Does Excessive Executive Compensation Matter?
Even if executive compensation is excessive and/or
poorly structured to encourage CEOs to strive for the best
corporate performance, why should shareholders care?
Some well-respected scholars have argued that
shareholders should remain indifferent to the amount of
CEO pay, since even the largest packages seldom total very
much on a per share basis."0 The CEO compensation system
may be troubled, but the impact on individual shareholders
is arguably minimal. After all, even if CEOs of the largest
corporations were paid $100 million per year, that would
often amount to only pennies per share. The most
77. See Murphy, supra note 48, at 126.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 11 (arguing that the amounts spent
on executive compensation are immaterial); Kevin J. Murphy, Politics,
Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 726 (1995)
(contending that the amount spent on CEO pay is not an important shareholder
issue, in part, because eliminating such pay entirely would add only a miniscule
percentage to shareholder returns). For example, the $123 million per year paid
on average to Michael Eisner from 1996-2002 translates to about $.06 per share
when divided by Disney's over 2 billion common shares outstanding. Similarly,
Larry Ellison's one-time compensation of $706 million amounts to $.13 for each
of the over 5.2 billion Oracle common shares outstanding. See Byrne et al.,
supra note 1, at 70; Condon, supra note 5, at 112.
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successful public corporations frequently have hundreds of
millions, if not billions, of shares. For example, IBM has 1.7
billion shares outstanding, Microsoft has 5.4 billion, Pfizer
6.1 billion, and General Electric 9.9 billion. With so many
shares, even a payment of $100 million represents less than
$. 10 per share for IBM, and only a little more than a penny
per share for G.E.
Such arguments miss the mark entirely. Dividing a cost
by a sufficiently large number will always make it appear
insignificant, but that tells us nothing about the
significance of the total sum. For example, in 1992 the total
budget of the United Nations was approximately $10.5
billion.8 This number may appear impressive at first
glance, but represents only $1.90 per person alive at that
time. In other words, the citizens of the world each spent
less on the U.N. than the cost of a single copy of the Sunday
New York Times. The amount on a per capita basis appears
trivial, but is this an argument for more funding or less?
One could argue that a cut in funding of a dime per person
is insignificant, but that would translate to a reduction of
over $550 million, more than the U.N. spent on world
health, the environment, science and technology, policy
making, political affairs, or trade and development that
year.
The discussion should focus on total amounts, not
meaningless comparisons to the corporation's earnings,
size, or number of shares outstanding. Otherwise, we are
left with the rather ridiculous conclusion that shareholders
of sufficiently large corporations should not care if the
company pays more than necessary for a factory, raw
materials, land, intellectual property, or any other factor of
production. The fact that there is only one CEO so that that
officer's salary must swell to gargantuan proportions to
appear meaningful when measured against the size of the
corporation is simply not an argument that proves that any
particular salary is reasonable.
There are many reasons to believe that excessive
compensation poses a serious problem. First, excessive
payments to the CEO signal potentially serious corporate
governance problems. A board of directors that cannot
81. See Nationalism vs. Internationalism, United Nations Budget, at http:ll




restrain the CEO on pay issues may also be failing to
monitor and control the CEO in areas of undisputed
significance, such as accounting, mergers and acquisitions,
and long-range business strategies. We can expect the
markets to pay increasing attention to such issues after the
recent round of corporate accounting scandals.
Second, pay that is not well-correlated to the CEO's
performance will fail to induce appropriate incentives. Pay
packages should be designed to motivate CEOs to achieve
shareholders' goals. Large salaries that are not tied to those
goals will only render CEOs increasingly independent of
shareholder concerns.
Third, the market recognizes the importance of an
expense that represents a few pennies per share. Company
reports that quarterly earnings will miss targets by that
amount or must be reduced by that amount sometimes
result in large declines in stock price." The consequences
for individual shareholders, therefore, reaches beyond any
marginal decrease in dividend payments.
Fourth, CEO compensation already can constitute a
significant percentage of corporate profits, at least during
troubled times. If CEO pay continues to grow at recent
rates, the impact on corporate profits will eventually
become not only significant but substantial. If the growth
rate of the past ten years persists, average CEO
compensation for the largest U.S. corporations could
approach $50 million per year a decade from now, and the
most generous packages could run into the billions." At the
highest levels, CEO compensation may begin to absorb
83. For example, on December 3, 2002, Walt Disney Co. revised its quarterly
earnings to reflect the dismal performance of the animated film "TREASURE
PLANET." Earnings were reduced by two cents per share. Disney's stock fell
some 9% during the twenty-four hours after the announcement. See Bruce
Orwall, Disney Revises Profit Downward As Movie Flops, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
2002, at A3, A8; CNN Money, Markets Can't Shake Losses, at http:lmoney.
cnn.com/2002/12/04/markets/markets-newyork/index.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2003).
84. CEO compensation grew at approximately 340% during the past ten
years. See Byrne et al., supra note 1, at 72. Current average compensation for
CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations is $11 million per year, id., with the
largest packages exceeding $700 million. See Gary Strauss, Companies Take
Action To Regain Investor Trust; As Image Of Big Business Turns Negative,
Firms Initiate Change, U.S.A. TODAY, July 17, 2002 at Al (stating that Oracle
CEO Larry Ellison cashed in options for a $706 million gain in 2001).
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most or all of corporate profits, even for well-performing
companies.
Fifth, enormous CEO pay packages represent large
opportunity costs for corporations. The tens or hundreds of
millions sometimes devoted to paying a single chief
executive could instead be used to build a new factory, hire
hundreds of lower-level employees, or engage in promising
research and development projects.
Sixth, and finally, news reports of the enormous pay
CEOs receive may undermine worker morale at all levels of
the corporate hierarchy, especially as the gap between
executive and worker pay accelerates. Declines in worker
morale may lead to declines in productivity, damaging
corporate profits.
In short, excessive and poorly structured CEO pay
should matter a great deal to shareholders because it
affects shareholder returns both directly, through
opportunity costs and poor management incentives, and
indirectly, through market and employee analyses of the
meaning of such pay packages for corporate governance.
C. The Need for a New Approach
This article is hardly the first to point out that there
may be a problem with executive compensation. 5 Previous
attempts to solve the problem can be broadly divided as
embracing one of two philosophies: the free market
approach or the regulatory approach. While both of these
approaches have put forward proposals with some promise,
neither seems likely to solve the problem entirely. A new
approach is therefore necessary.
The free market approach is characterized by a belief
that the market will, on its own, achieve an efficient level
and structure of executive compensation. Self-interested
managers and directors, in a quest to boost their company's
stock price, thereby directly or indirectly enhancing their
pay and reputation, will structure their own compensation
efficiently. Rational investors will perceive that managers
are properly motivated through their compensation pack-
ages and not absorbing an inefficient level of the company's
profits. These investors will then value the company more
highly, and pay more for its stock, because they will
85. See supra notes 45-79 and accompanying text.
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correctly believe that the company is and will be run
efficiently. The most important examples of proposals
employing the free market approach include greater
reliance on options as a compensation method"6 and
institutional investors taking a more active role in
corporate governance 7
In the past ten years, options have become the single
most important component of CEO compensation."8 An
option gives the holder the right to buy a share of stock in
the future for a fixed price, called the exercise price or
strike price. The longer the term of the option, and the
lower the strike price, the more valuable the option.89 Strike
prices are almost universally set at the market price the
day the option is granted."
86. See, e.g., Clawson & Klein, supra note 48, at 32 (discussing indexed
options); Arthur H. Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1404
(1953) ("[Slome investors prefer to own stock in a corporation in which
management or at least the key personnel have a material stake in the
ownership of the business, so that they will have greater incentive to conduct
the business in a manner wholly consistent with the interests of the
investors."); Michael W. Melton, The Alchemy of Incentive Stock Options-
Turning Employee Income Into Gold, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 501 (1983)
("Encouraging the management of business to have a proprietary interest in its
successful operation will provide an important incentive to expand and improve
the profit position of the companies involved."); Eric J. Wittenberg, Underwater
Stock Options: What's a Board of Directors to Do?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 104-07
(1988) (suggesting methods for repricing options whose strike price is
significantly above market due to a market decline).
87. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?:
Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1997 (1994) (proposing legal reform to improve institutional investor activism);
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 48 (arguing that institutional investors should
appoint "professional directors" to corporate boards); and Roberta Romano, Less
Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism A Valuable Mechanism of
Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001) (recommending reforms to
encourage institutional investor activism).
88. For S&P 500 firms, the salary portion of CEO compensation declined
from 36% to 21% of total compensation from 1992-98. The option-based portion
of CEO compensation increased from 22% to 38% from 1992-1998 in S&P 500
firms. See Perry & Zenner, supra note 45, at 131. See also Barris, supra note 45,
at 64 (stating that options increased as a percentage of total compensation from
8% in 1985 to 31% in 1991).
89. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 477 (Concise 8th ed. 2000).
90. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 48, at 817 ("An analysis of options
granted to the CEOs of one thousand large companies in 1992 determined that
95 percent of the options were granted at-the-money, that is, with an exercise
price equal to the company's stock price on the date of the grant.").
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In theory, options align managers' incentives with those
of shareholders.91 Options become more valuable as the
market price of the underlying stock increases because at
the time of exercise, options are worth the spread between
the strike price and the market price. The higher the
market price, the larger the spread and the more valuable
the options become. To the extent that shareholders are
exclusively concerned with increasing the stock's market
price, issuing large numbers of options to managers should
infuse executives with the same concern.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this theoretical
argument, options may not align incentives particularly
well and may even disguise management's efforts to obtain
excessive compensation. As Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried,
and David Walker recently pointed out in the Chicago Law
Review, traditional options camouflage the economic rents
being extracted by management.92 Traditional options are
exploited in several ways. First, options naturally tend to
overcompensate executives. Options allow CEOs to benefit
from general market increases having nothing to do with
the company's individual performance, without suffering
from market downturns." Very few companies employ
options that are indexed to the relevant market sector.
Worse yet, companies sometimes decrease options' strike
price when the company's share price declines, but almost
never increase the strike price when the stock market as a
whole is rising."
Second, options facilitate efforts to rationalize excessive
CEO salaries. When the stock market is rising, board
91. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 20, at 214.
92. Bebchuk et al., supra note 48, at 756.
93. Id. at 797-98 ("[C]ompensation based on absolute share price
performance rewards managers even when the managers' efforts have not
contributed to the share price increase. In particular, the share price increase
might be driven solely by factors external to the firm-such as changes in the
economy that benefit the firm's industry or interest rate declines that benefit
the market as a whole."). The authors cite a study that found general market
conditions account for 70% of a stock's performance. Id. at 797.
94. Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack examined the S&P ExecuCom
database for 1992-95. Of the 806 cases they discovered in which boards reset
option prices, Brenner et al. found that the strike price was increased in only
two cases, or about .25%. On average, exercise prices were reduced 39%. This
occurred during a period in which the S&P 500 Index rose by about 50%. One
would expect the incidence of strike price resetting to be even higher in down
markets. Id. at 821-22.
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members can argue that management is only doing well
because shareholders are prospering. When share prices
decline, however, directors can easily find ways to justify
repricing options-resetting the strike price to a lower level.
For example, the board might contend that the decline is
due to general market conditions, not the CEO's
mismanagement. Or directors might argue that failing to
reprice the options will eliminate the CEO's performance
incentive, perhaps inducing mismanagement or at least
CEO slacking."
Finally, traditional options tend to fly under investors'
radar screens. Corporations traditionally have not been
required to deduct options' value as expenses, so their
impact on quarterly profits has been buried in footnotes in
the company's financial statements." It increasingly looks
as though this may now change, however. In April of 2003,
the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") agreed
that companies should begin expensing options. 7 Although
a dispute over how to value options will likely delay final
regulations until the third quarter of 2004, about 20% of the
companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index have
begun expensing options voluntarily.98
Thus, although options theoretically align managers'
incentives with those of shareholders, in fact they have
been used as a tool to overcompensate managers by
rewarding executives for general market increases having
nothing to do with their efforts, failing to hold CEOs
95. See Yablon, supra note 46, at 1878-79 ("[A]ny poor performance or
reversal in corporate fortunes can be attributed to some external event: a
downturn in the economy, undervaluation of the corporation's stock by the
market, rising prices for needed raw materials, a weak dollar, a strong dollar,
unfair foreign competition, for example.").
96. Prior to 1995, under Opinion 25 of the Accounting Principles Board,
corporations were not required to report options as expenses so long as the
option was technically valueless (because the exercise price was set above the
market price) on the grant date. In 1992, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board suggested expensing options but retreated in the face of heavy opposition
from the financial community and from Congress. Ultimately, in 1995, the
FASB passed SFAS 123, which grants corporations a choice between expensing
options in the income statement or disclosing their value in a footnote. See
Clawson & Klein, supra note 48, at 35-36.
97. See Lingling Wei, Major Companies Will 'Road-Test' Options Standard,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2003, at A17.




accountable for declines in the company's stock price, and
masking the amount of compensation.
Other performance-based structures advocated by
adherents of the market approach are similarly subject to
manipulation. For example, Charles Elson has advocated
replacing options with restricted stock, stock that cannot be
sold while the recipient is employed with the company."
While Elson has focused on payments to directors, similar
principles could apply to paying executives. Restricted stock
solves some of the incentive and monitoring problems
associated with options. Unlike options, restricted stock
generally cannot be sold until the executive leaves the
company. Directors and executives paid in restricted stock
therefore would not have an incentive to artificially inflate
the share price over the short term, since they would not be
able to cash in their stock until some time after they leave
the company. °9 Also, restricted stock must be expensed
when issued, unlike traditional options.'0 '
But restricted stock fails to solve two problems with
options: (1) they make justifying enormous salaries too
easy; and (2) they reward recipients for rises in the stock
price that have nothing to do with how particular directors
and executives have managed the company. Also, under a
restricted stock compensation plan, some incentive
problems remain. Corporate leaders will retain an incentive
99. See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock
Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 690-92 (1995) [hereinafter "Elson I"]
(suggesting that directors should be paid in restricted stock); see also Charles
M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 937, 981-83 (1993) [hereinafter "Elson II"]; Charles M. Elson, Director
Compensation And The Management-Captured Board-The History Of A
Symptom and a Cure, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 127, 164-73 (1996) [hereinafter "Elson
III"]; Murphy, supra note 80, at 738 ("[Restricted stock] continues to be one of
the most effective vehicles for providing both incentives and compensation to
managers.").
100. See Elson III, supra note 99, at 130-31; Elson II, supra note 99, at 985
("To prevent the quick liquidation of these stock payments and consequent loss
of equity-based incentive, the stock awarded must be restricted as to resale
during the individual's directorship.").
101. See Michel R. Flyer, Employee Benefits And Executive Compensation, in
TAx AND BUSINESS PLANNING 359, 389 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, May 9-11,
1991), available in Westlaw, ALI-ABA Database ("If the restricted stock is
provided to the employee in recognition of his past services, the employer
should treat the compensation cost attributable to the grant of restricted stock
as an expense in the period of grant.").
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to deflate the share price just before their restricted stock is
issued to them.
In addition, awards of restricted stock actually worsen
some incentive problems. Officers paid in restricted stock
face greater risk: unlike most public shareholders, they
cannot diversify the bulk of their holdings to protect
themselves from non-systemic risks."2 Although this is also
true to some extent with options, restricted stock increases
the risk because the time horizon for cashing in restricted
stock will be much longer than is typical for options.
Executives can be expected to attempt to moderate this risk
either through derivative trading (which if permitted will
eliminate the positive incentive effects of restricted stock)
or through corporate acquisitions that transform the
corporation into a diversified investment vehicle, something
that will generally be against the interests of diversified
shareholders.13
The free market school has also argued that
institutional investors will eventually solve problems-such
as those with executive compensation-that stem from the
split between ownership and control in public cor-
porations.' Unlike most other types of shareholders,
102. Non-systemic risks are those that do not permeate through all
companies. For example, the risk of excessive rainfall is a non-systemic risk.
The extra rain will benefit umbrella companies, but hurt suntan lotion
manufacturers. It is difficult to imagine a pure systemic risk. As Shakespeare
wrote, it is "the ill wind that blows no man to good." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
HENRY IV PART 2, ACT 5, SCENE 3, in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 920 (G.
Blakemore Evans ed., 1974).
103. See Ellis, supra note 48, at 403-05 (pointing out the problems
associated with both permitting and barring derivative trading by executives).
104. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 811, 815-16 (1992) (suggesting
benefits to greater institutional investor monitoring outweigh dangers); Alfred
F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 117, 176-78 (1988) (advocating reforms to facilitate institutional
investor monitoring); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and
Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 882-83 (1989)
(proposing to grant control of proxy solicitations to a committee of the
corporation's largest shareholders); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 880
(arguing for having institutional investors elect professional directors); Martin
Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 63-64 (1987) (proposing changes in the tax code to shift institutional
investors' focus to the long-term); cf Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A and
13D and the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 376, 378 (1992) (arguing that changes in the securities laws to facilitate
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institutional investors, such as mutual funds, private and
public pension funds, banks, and insurance companies,
typically own large amounts of stock."5 These entities
possess the potential to reunify ownership and control.
Institutional investors may own large enough blocks of a
company's stock to exercise real control, especially if they
act in concert. Moreover, concentrated stock ownership may
mean that the rewards that come from close monitoring of
corporate activities outweigh the associated costs. As a
result, institutional investors should possess a strong
incentive to oppose any attempt by the CEO to act contrary
to the shareholders' interests.
Unfortunately, this theory has often not borne out well
in practice, in part because of two popular investment
strategies, diversification and indexing. Most institutional
investors diversify their holdings to reduce risk exposure."6
Dividing investments among many different companies
limits the consequences of a disaster suffered by any single
corporation. But by limiting their investments in any one
company, institutional investors also sharply reduce their
incentive to monitor any particular corporation's manage-
ment. O7
institutional investor activism are not necessary or advisable, in part because
institutional investors are already often successful in influencing management).
105. See EISENBERG, supra note 89, at 118.
106. See Bogus, supra note 45, at 42 (finding that institutional investors
diversify widely; even CalPERS seldom owns more than 1% of a company's
outstanding shares); Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs In
American Corporate Finance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1997) (explaining
institutional investors diversify to reduce risk (variance on returns) of
investments); Ralph K. Winter, On 'Protecting The Ordinary Investor,' 63
WASH. L. REV. 881, 886-87 (1988) (suggesting that institutional investors
protect themselves "from systemic and unsystemic risk through
diversification").
107. See Stephen Thurber, The Insider Trading Compensation Contract as
an Inducement to Monitoring by the Institutional Investor, 1 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 119, 128 (1994) ("[Wlhether because of trading practices or liquidity
concerns, many institutional investors prefer taking small positions, often for
short periods of time. Both small positions and short holding periods make
significant returns from monitoring less likely. Small positions are unlikely to
benefit from monitoring because of cost problems; positions held for short
periods are unlikely to benefit from monitoring because of ineffectiveness of
monitoring during the holding period. In either case, monitoring has
insufficient practical benefits for the trading and liquidity-oriented institutional
investor.").
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Many institutional investors now also employ indexing
for part or all of their equity investments.' Indexing
involves buying stock in all of the companies in a particular
sector index or in the market as a whole, often weighted
according to market capitalization. Academic studies have
asserted that in the long-term, the vast majority of
investors who choose individual stocks will underperform
the relevant market index.0 9 An additional advantage of
indexing is that it eliminates the need for expensive
research on individual corporations. In other words,
institutional investors who practice indexing need not
monitor corporate behavior and, therefore, will not want to
bear the expense of an active role in managing the
corporation.
Another reason institutional investors may not prove
an effective panacea is that institutional investors often
have close ties to the corporations in which they invest."'
Institutional investors include private and public pension
funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and banks.
With the exception of public pension funds, all of these
entities may seek business from the same companies whose
stock they own. A private pension fund, for example, may
invest in a manufacturing corporation and also attempt to
secure that corporation's employee pension account. Banks,
mutual funds, and insurance companies may face similar
conflicts of interest. Rather than risk potentially lucrative
new business, conflicted institutional investors may
cheerfully permit executives to pay themselves exorbitant
108. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-
Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 860 (1994); Vanecko, supra note 104, at
408-09.
109. See Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention:
Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship
Investing, 20 J. CORP. L. 413, 440-41 (1995) (highlighting that the efficient
capital market hypothesis suggests that active investors rarely earn greater
returns than passive investors in the market as a whole); BURTON G. MALKIEL,
A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 373 (1999) ("The Standard & Poor's 500-
Stock Index, a composite that represents 75 percent of the value of all U.S.-
traded common stocks, beats most of the experts over the long pull."); Lynn A.
Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure and
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 664 (1995) ("Active funds incur much
higher trading and management costs than passive funds and on average earn
lower returns than either passive funds or the market as a whole.").
110. See Vanecko, supra note 104, at 408-09 (explaining the disincentives to
monitoring faced by indexed investors).
111. See EISENBERG, supra note 89, at 118.
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salaries, reasoning that the resulting new business easily
offsets any loss suffered by the investor's equity stake.
Finally, institutional investors are themselves
corporations, run by CEOs who desire large compensation
packages. Deflating the market for executive compensation
runs directly counter to these officers' interest. The more
CEOs at comparable corporations receive in compensation,
the easier it will be to justify increases in salary packages
for the heads of institutional investors. The converse is also
true. Institutional investors cannot argue for reductions in
the packages of heads of other corporations without being
hoisted by their own petards, facing similar contentions
regarding their own salaries. The placement of CEOs of
other corporations on the board of institutional investors
only makes this problem more obvious.
Public pension funds, in contrast, need not seek
business from the companies in which they invest. In
addition, public pension funds answer to political
institutions, which often prove more sensitive to governance
problems than do the shareholders of banks, mutual funds,
or the corporations that hire private fund mangers. For
these reasons, public pension funds such as CalPERS often
play an active role in demanding governance reform. To
take just one recent example, public pension funds led the
movement calling for former New York Stock Exchange
Chairman Dick Grasso's resignation.
In summary, although institutional investors own large
amounts of stock, investment strategies such as
diversification and indexing sharply reduce the likelihood
that their investments will be sufficiently concentrated to
make close monitoring and/or control worthwhile. Even if
this were not the case, private institutional investors' ties to
the corporations in which they invest, and the conflict of
interest of these institutions' CEOs on compensation issues,
combine to undermine institutional investors' effectiveness
in reunifying ownership and control in the executive
compensation context. Nevertheless, public pension funds
do sometimes successfully advocate for governance reform,
and greater attention should be devoted to energizing them.
The market approach contains tremendous intuitive
appeal, but the concrete recommendations implemented
thus far have failed to achieve their promise. Perhaps
scholars will invent new devices that will better harness the
power of markets-and more successfully avoid market
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failures-to induce managers to voluntarily select efficient
compensation packages. But any such devices will need to
overcome the powerful incentive of managers to circumvent
the imposed safeguards so that they may secure for
themselves a greater share of the corporation's wealth. So
long as the managers of public corporations do not entirely
(or even mostly) own those corporations, the conflict
between managers' and owners' incentives will remain, and
the market approach will continue to face challenges that at
the moment appear nearly insurmountable.
Adherents of the regulatory approach argue that the
problems with executive compensation can be corrected by
regulation that overcomes market failures.11  Selfish,
rational shareholders and directors may lack sufficient
information, predictive ability, or incentive to reach the
socially optimal result through unmanaged competition. 113
Moreover, human rationality is bounded, subject to
numerous heuristics and biases that warp perceptions of
which choices are strategically correct.' As a result,
regulation is sometimes necessary to force the disclosure of
information, structure appropriate incentives, or protect
market participants from their own lapses in rationality.
The two dominant proposals employing the regulatory
approach are attempts to obtain greater court supervision
of executive salaries and efforts to regulate compensation
directly.
Courts have historically proven reluctant to intervene
in executive compensation decisions. Simply put, directors
and executives of public corporations face little or no real
threat of liability. The courts have developed doctrines that
allow review of only the rarest case, if any. Claims of
excessive compensation-like most claims based on poor
decisions by management-belong to the corporation, so
irate shareholders must launch a derivative action to obtain
relief." 5 But derivative actions are very difficult to launch.
The shareholder plaintiff must first either demand that the
112. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 20, at 113.
113. See generally id.
114. See Jolls et al., supra note 27, at 14-15.
115. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253-64 (Del. 2000) (analyzing
excessive compensation claims as derivative); Bender v. Ferro, 448 N.Y.S.2d
666, 667 (1st Dep't 1982) (asserting claim that corporation paid managers
excessive salaries is derivative).
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board cause the corporation to launch the suit, or
demonstrate that such demand is excused because futile.
To qualify under the futility prong under Delaware
law,"6 plaintiffs must allege particularized facts that create
a reasonable doubt that (1) the directors are disinterested
and independent, or (2) the challenged transaction was
otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment."7 For the first prong, the court determines
whether there is a reasonable doubt that business udgment
rule protection will be available to the board. 8 Merely
naming the directors in the suit is insufficient to create
futility; the directors must bear a substantial chance of
personal liability."9 Under the second prong, the court must
consider whether the challenged transaction is likely to
pass the business judgment rule test. Since the business
judgment rule test only requires that the directors have
made an informed, deliberative decision that is not grossly
negligent, 21 compensation decisions will rarely flunk.
Even those lucky plaintiffs who somehow make it past
the demand requirement remain unlikely to obtain relief.
Compensation decisions, like other business decisions by
the board, are evaluated under the business judgment
rule.'2' So long as the board has taken the formulaic
procedural steps to pass the business judgment rule, the
compensation decision will pass. Short of fraud or self-
dealing, the only exception to business judgment rule
protection is the waste standard.2 2 But to meet this
standard the shareholder must prove that the disinterested,
116. The article primarily discusses Delaware law because the majority of
public corporations are registered in Delaware and therefore subject to
Delaware law for internal governance issues. See EISENBERG, supra note 89, at
68.
117. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds, Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253-54 (overruling on the scope of review of the
appellate court).
118. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
119. Id. at 815 ("However, the mere threat of personal liability for approving
a questioned transaction, standing alone, is insufficient to challenge either the
independence or disinterestedness of directors, although in rare cases a
transaction may be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the
test of business judgment, and a substantial likelihood of director liability
therefore exists.").
120. Id. at 812; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).




non-fraudulent, non-negligent board authorized "an
exchange that is so one sided that no business person of
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration."'23 As
former Chancellor Allen has stated, such claims, like the
Loch Ness Monster, are so rare as to possibly be non-
existent.
12 4
Though courts have historically been reluctant to.
supervise compensation decisions in public corporations,
legislatures could by statute lower the standard of review.
Charles Yablon, for example, has advocated a wider role for
courts in this area.'25 But such legislation seems unlikely to
improve matters. As Mark Loewenstein has pointed out,
coming out with a lower standard of review that would force
courts to evaluate executive compensation would likely
flood the courts with litigation and make judges the
primary decision-makers on compensation issues. 2' And as
Ronald Gilson has argued, courts seem unsuitable monitors
of compensation decisions.'27 They have little relevant
expertise, and any standard of decision will of necessity be
rather amorphous, like Yablon's proposed "reasonable in
relation to the corporate benefits expected.' ' 2' The decisions
are therefore likely to be inconsistent and unpredictable,
making it difficult for boards to function. Moreover, if
directors become liable for making poor, multi-million
dollar compensation decisions, it will likely become difficult
or impossible to find qualified people willing to serve as
directors.
In summary, because courts have historically proven
unwilling to impose liability on directors except for gross
123. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch.
1998), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.
124. See Steiner v. Meyerson, C.A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del.
Ch. 1995). But see Sanders v. Wang, 1999 WL 1044880 (Del. Ch. 1999) (denying
a motion to dismiss a waste claim in an executive compensation case).
125. See Yablon, supra note 46, at 1896-1906 (arguing for a standard
demanding that compensation be reasonable in proportion to the benefits
expected).
126. Loewenstein, supra note 45, at 211.
127. See Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and Corporate
Governance; An Academic Perspective, in 24th Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation 647, 672-74 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. B4-7017, 1992) ("Courts are the least suitable monitor of
compensation decisions.").
128. Yablon, supra note 46, at 1897.
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failures to supervise management, and because any
attempt to involve courts in such supervision is likely to
produce more harm than good, liability, like director
compensation packages, fails to engender in directors an
incentive to monitor corporations closely and to oppose
management when appropriate.
The other popular method of employing the regulatory
approach to the problem of executive compensation is to
regulate that compensation directly by statute. The
simplest form of such regulation would be to impose upper
limits on executive salaries. These limits could take the
form of absolute ceilings, or they could be structured as a
function of some relevant corporate statistic, such as a fixed
multiple of the lowest-paid worker in the company.
The problem with such direct regulation is that it tends
to be both underinclusive and overinclusive. Compensation
ceilings (of either form) are underinclusive in that they tend
to have a justificatory effect for salaries that were
previously below the set limit. 129 The law implicitly sends a
message that compensation below the ceiling is acceptable,
regardless of its appropriateness under other measures
such as relationship to corporate performance.13 Compensa-
tion ceilings are also overinclusive in that some chief
executives may be worth more than the ceiling permits. 3 '
Preventing corporations from paying these managers their
true value would distort the market for managers, a market
which, as argued above, is already deeply troubled.'32
The most recent effort to regulate executive salaries
directly was the passage of Section 162(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code under the Clinton Administration.' This
law presents an illustrative case study of the problems
inherent in direct regulation of executive salaries. Section
162(m) prohibits corporations from deducting certain
129. See Graef Crystal, Slim Fast for Corporate Fat Cats: Why Not Let
Shareholders Vote on Top Executives' Pay Packages?, WASH. POST, May 16,
1993, at C2 ("If $1 million is a reasonable level of pay for the CEO of a high-
performing company, then it is too high for the CEO of a poor-performing
company. And if $1 million is a reasonable level of pay for the CEO of a poor-
performing company, it is too low for the CEO of a high-performing company.").
130. Id.
131. Id; Elson II, supra note 99, at 958 (nothing is inherently wrong with
salaries over $1 million); Loewenstein, supra note 45, at 218 ($1 million is both
too high and too low).
132. See supra notes 45-79 and accompanying text.
133. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2002).
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executives' compensation over $1 million except to the
extent the compensation is based on performance.14 The
purpose of the statute was to discourage companies from
paying executives excessive salaries unless they were tied
to corporate performance and to end federal tax subsidies
for compensation packages that exceeded the maximum
guidelines.'35
The overall effect of Section 162(m), however, was not
to lower compensation but to change its form. In fact, in the
two years immediately after 162(m) was passed, average
CEO salary and bonus increased by more than 10%.' In
addition, corporations responded to the new law by issuing
more options to their executives.'37 While payment in stock
options theoretically increases the sensitivity of pay to
performance, options are incapable of distinguishing
between the executive's own performance and that of the
company or stock market as a whole.'38 Section 162(m) did
not succeed in reducing executive compensation. Executives
and corporations quickly found methods to circumvent the
new restraints.
The regulatory approach to solving the executive
compensation problem has struggled against executives'
strong incentive to overcome any barriers erected. As with
the market approach, scholars and policymakers may yet
develop new forms of regulation that successfully curtail
and restructure executive compensation in the face of
executives' powerful resistance. So far, however, executives
appear to have largely succeeded in avoiding the restraints
of regulation.
134. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2002) (excluding from the salary cap "any
remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more
performance goals").
135. See Crystal, supra note 129, at C2.
136. See Loewenstein, supra note 45, at 219-20. But see Tod Perry & Mark
Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of
Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453 (2001) (contending that many
million-dollar firms have reduced salaries as a result of §162(m) and the growth
rate of executive compensation has slowed for the firms most likely to be
affected).
137. See Richard H. Wagner & Catherine G. Wagner, Recent Developments
in Executive, Director, and Employee Stock Compensation Plans: New Concerns
for Corporate Directors, 3 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 5, 6 (1997) (demonstrating
that the number of executive stock plans and the number of shares reserved for
such plans have exploded in past few years).
138. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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The market and regulatory approaches have both
yielded many promising avenues of reform, some of which
have been tried. Neither, however, has achieved notable
success in solving the problem of the separation of
ownership and control generally, nor the executive
compensation problem in particular. For this reason, it is
time to try a new approach as a supplement to the other
two, employing the insights of behavioral economics and
psychology in an attempt to modify human behavior.
Before turning to a discussion of altruistic theory,
however, there is one component of the explanation of the
executive compensation problem that requires further
analysis: captured boards of directors.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CAPTURED BOARDS
Recall that the difficulty in evaluating the efficiency of
CEO pay packages stemmed from the absence of an
efficient market for CEO services. This market failure, in
turn, is rooted in the tendency of boards of directors to
acquiesce to CEO demands instead of bargaining for the
best possible deal for the corporation. Earlier, the article
asserted board passivity as a fact while postponing the
analysis of why such passivity exists. The article turns to
that question now.
Direct evidence of boards' failure to resist CEO
demands is difficult to obtain. Board members can hardly
be expected to confess to breaching their fiduciary duties on
an interview form. Nevertheless, there is substantial
indirect and anecdotal evidence in the form of results:
boards rarely seem to oppose CEO-sponsored resolutions,
particularly on executive compensation, short of a corporate
crisis.
139. See Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of
Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, 15
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72, 73 (1990) ("[Mlanagers dominate their boards by using
their de facto power to select and compensate directors and by exploiting
personal ties with them."), quoted in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 562
(2003); Elson II, supra note 99, at 942 ("The board is not representative of any
one shareholder or shareholder group, but is picked by and responsive to the
leading officers of the corporation."); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEo. L. J. 797 (2001) ("The dominant view
in corporate governance theory today is that heavy emphasis on teamwork and
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A number of factors tend to produce board passivity.
These factors include problems of the selection and
composition of boards, pressures on board members once
they are appointed, directors' lack of resources, and
particular issues with compensation decisions.
A. Selection and Composition of Boards of Directors
Unlike most democratic political elections, people
running for a directorship in a public corporation rarely
face opposing candidates. Instead, except for unusual
situations such as a proxy fight, the number of nominations
generally matches the number of open board slots.14° The
candidates' election, then, is little more than a formality.
These candidates are selected by the board's nomination
committee.141 The CEO has tremendous influence on the
nomination committee's decisions. Formally, the CEO sits
on the nomination committee in a substantial number of
public corporations."' In addition, the nomination com-
mittee is urged to consider the CEO's candidates. 3
conflict-avoidance marks a board that has been captured by its CEO .... );
Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 15 n.86 (citing other sources arguing that boards
are captured by management).
140. See Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40
CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 38 (1990).
Shareholders in large publicly held companies, while nominally
empowered under state law to elect the directors who will represent
their interests, are systematically deprived of two significant
opportunities: they are neither permitted to play a meaningful role in
the selection of directorial candidates, nor to choose among competitive
candidates for scarce board positions.
Id. The lack of competitive director elections is in part because institutional
shareholders face many obstacles to nominating their own directors, including a
risk of liability for insider trading or short-swing profits, and because Rule 14a-
8 prohibits director nominations in proxy solicitations. See Black, supra note
104, at 823-24.
141. See Barnard, supra note 140, at 38.
142. See Bogus, supra note 45, at 34 (citing survey with an admittedly small
sample size that found 90-100% of all directorial candidates were recommended
by the CEO); Perry & Zenner, supra note 45, at 135-36 (study by Anil
Shivdasani and David Yermack found that only 77.5% of firms had nomination
committees, and that CEOs sat on 32.5% of those nomination committees that
did exist).
143. WILLIAM L. CAR & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS § 3.06(b)(2) (6th ed. 1988) ("The nominating committee
should.., consider candidates for directorships proposed by the chief executive
officer .. .").
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Informally, the nomination committee is likely to defer to
the CEO's recommendations because of the pressures and
resource constraints described below. As a result, in many
cases the CEO will effectively hand-pick the board of
directors, and will almost always exercise a great deal of
influence on the selection process.
In part because of this influence, the board members
chosen tend to be people who seem likely to defer to the
CEO, who will allow the CEO free rein over the
corporation's affairs. Although talented and experienced
board members may yield sage counsel, they may also
threaten the CEO's control over the company and
ultimately his or her job security. As a result, as Warren
Buffet has famously quipped, "There is a tendency to put
cocker spaniels on compensation committees, not Doberman
pinschers." 144
The largest group of board members consists of chief
executive officers of other large public corporations.145
Because CEOs want their own companies' boards to remain
passive, they have little incentive to oppose management's
desires when they sit on boards of other corporations. This
dynamic is particularly pervasive when boards are
interlocking; that is, when two or more CEOs sit on each
other's boards of directors. Interlocking boards render
explicit the implicit reciprocity of passivity that exists
whenever CEOs of other companies become directors.
A second popular source of board members is "insiders,"
officers of the company or various outside experts-such as
lawyers, accountants or consultants-who do a great deal of
work for the corporation.'46 The advantage of using insiders
is that they start out already knowing a great deal about
the company's operation, arguably making them more
effective monitors. But this group is perhaps the most likely
to defer to the CEO since insiders' careers depend on
144. Keith Naughton et al., The Perk Wars: As Jack Welch's Retirement Deal
Sparks an Investor Backlash, Perks Could Become the New Stock Options,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 2002, at 44.
145. CEOs of other companies constitute some 63% of outside directors. See
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 875.
146. For example, Microsoft's eight-member board includes insiders Bill
Gates, the company's Chief Software Architect, Steven Ballmer, the CEO, and
Jon Shirley, the company's retired president and COO. See Microsoft PressPass,
Microsoft Board of Directors, at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/bod/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2003).
20031 845
846 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
maintaining the CEO's good opinion. Increasingly, reform
efforts have focused on excluding insiders from the board,
or at least from certain key committees. 47
A third group often appointed to boards consists of
friends of the CEO. 48 The CEO's friends are also quite
likely to defer to the CEO's lead in setting company policy.
Having been appointed to a desirable' position out of
friendship, they seem particularly unlikely to respond by
questioning the CEO's policies.
Institutional investors constitute a fourth group
sometimes represented on boards. In theory, institutional
investors are the ideal board members because they may
own significant amounts of the corporation's stock.' As a
result, institutional investors should possess a strong
incentive to oppose any attempt by the CEO to act contrary
to the shareholders' interests. But, as explained above,'1
this theory has not borne out well in practice, in part
because the popular investment strategies of diversification
and indexing. These strategies encourage spreading the
investor's capital among large numbers of companies,
147. For example, in 1992 the Clinton administration succeeded in passing
§ 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which effectively requires that the
compensation committee of large corporations consist entirely of independent
board members. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i) (1992) (permitting corporations
to deduct performance-based compensation above $1 million if, inter alia, "the
performance goals are determined by a compensation committee of the board of
directors of the taxpayer which is comprised solely of 2 or more outside
directors").
148. See Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41
UCLA L. REV. 75, 109 (1993) (stating that the boardroom is full of CEO's
friends); Yablon, supra note 46, at 1881 (explaining that outside directors are
generally friends of the CEO).
149. Board memberships are widely considered highly desirable positions
because they demand little work for the compensation provided and are very
prestigious. See infra Part 1I(B).
150. See Black, supra note 104, at 815-16 (arguing that benefits to greater
institutional investor monitoring outweigh dangers); Conard, supra note 104, at
176-78 (advocating reforms to facilitate institutional investor monitoring); Dent,
supra note 104, at 882-83 (proposing to grant control of proxy solicitations to a
committee of the corporation's largest shareholders); Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 48, at 880 (arguing for having institutional investors elect professional
directors); Lipton, supra note 104, at 63-64 (proposing changes in the tax code
to shift institutional investors' focus to the long-term); cf. Vanecko, supra note
104, at 378 (arguing that changes in the securities laws to facilitate
institutional investor activism are not necessary or advisable, in part because
institutional investors are already often successful in influencing management).
151. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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greatly reducing the amount even the largest portfolios
have invested in any single corporation. Without
concentrated ownership, there is insufficient incentive for
institutional investors to invest in monitoring or in active
board membership.
A final group of board members are the true
independents, frequently consisting of academics or
prominent retired politicians, appointed to enhance the
board's credibility.' These "celebrity" appointees may or
may not have expertise relevant to their tasks as directors,
but their fame in academia or government should provide
an incentive to behave independently of the CEO.
Celebrities can be expected to work to preserve their hard-
earned reputation for integrity and intelligence. They risk
this reputation if they meekly accede to the CEO's every
desire. Nevertheless, short of a corporate crisis, even the
celebrity directors face powerful incentives to bow to the
CEO's will, as described in the next section.
B. Temptations of Board Membership
Why are board members-even celebrity board
members-generally so deferential to the CEO? In part,
this compliance is due to pressures inherent in the office.
Simply put, the job of corporate director pays well, is
steeped in prestige, requires relatively little time
commitment, and often yields substantial benefits. Such
plums are hard to come by, and, once achieved, difficult to
relinquish. Since displeasing the CEO means risking one's
position as a board member, we can expect most board
members to oppose the CEO's desires only when the stakes
are dramatic. When the company's future is at risk, if
directors accede to poor decisions by the CEO they face a
high likelihood of extremely negative publicity, multiple
shareholder lawsuits, and perhaps even a proxy fight or
hostile takeover attempt. But for more mundane issues-
such as executive compensation-board members will
rarely suffer material adverse consequences from
152. Examples abound. IBM's board, for example, includes Nannerl 0.
Keohane, the President of Duke University, and Charles M. Vest, the president
of M.I.T.; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sat on American Express'
board for some time; Sidney Poitier was, until recently, a Disney director; and




compliance, yet risk the loss of a comfortable, lucrative
position if they resist. This dichotomy creates a powerful
incentive for even the most independent director to
rationalize a decision to vote with the CEO.
Compensation of directors of Fortune 1000 companies
averages $116,000 per year; $152,000 for Fortune 200
corporations.15 ' Director pay takes the form of a retainer
plus fees paid for each meeting directors attend, on the
order of $1000 per meeting, and for each special task they
take on, such as chairing a committee. 5 Directors also
receive stock options, sometimes in substantial amounts.155
The Enron directors, to take an extreme example, were paid
as much as $350,000 in cash, stock and options.5w p
Directors also frequently receive substantial benefits.
Many corporations pay for various forms of insurance for
their board members, including health, dental, disability
and life insurance in addition, of course, to director and
officer liability insurance.5 7 Corporations also grant pension
plans to some directors who have served several terms.'58
Further, directors may receive the right to decide where
some portion of the corporation's annual charity will be
donated.5 9 For example, in 1995, American Express gave
one of its board members-Henry Kissinger-the right to
donate $500,000 to the charity of Kissinger's choice upon
his death. 6 °
Directorships may also lead to other opportunities. It is
not uncommon for CEOs to hire directors as consultants for
special projects.' Such consultancies can be incredibly
lucrative, many times the director's cash compensation.'1
2
153. See Gary Strauss, Companies Pony Up to Keep Directors; Board Seats
Have Become Hot Seats, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 21, 2002, at B1.
154. See David Phelps & Patrick Kennedy, Due Diligence; Regulators, Stock
Exchanges, and Investors are Placing More Scrutiny Than Ever... ON THE
BOARD; Pay, Perks Vary at Minnesota Firms, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-
St.Paul), Aug. 11, 2002, at ID.
155. Id.
156. See John A. Byrne, No Excuses for Enron's Board, Bus. WK., July 29,
2002, at 50.
157. See Elson III, supra note 99, at 147.
158. See id.; Eisenberg I, supra note 46, at 134-37.
159. See Eisenberg I, supra note 46, at 133.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 133-34.
162. In 1995, for example, American Express paid Kissinger $350,000 in
annual consulting fees. Id. at 133.
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There is currently, however, some movement to restrict
directors' ability to receive consulting contracts.163
Board memberships may also lead to additional board
memberships. Directors frequently serve on more than one
board and, as previously mentioned, CEOs also frequently
serve on the boards of other corporations. As a result, a new
board member suddenly has access to a group of people in
an excellent position to recommend him or her to additional
boards. In addition, membership on the board of a major
public corporation is an excellent credential in attempting
to qualify for a position as the director of some other major
public corporation.
Gerald Davis has traced the resulting connections
among board members with startling results."' In a
variatioA of the "Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon" game,165 Davis
investigated the interlinking of corporate boards by asking
how many directors are required to connect any two
corporations. For example, if Director A sits on the board of
Corporation 1 with Director B, and Director B sits on the
board of Corporation 2 with Director C, and Director C also
sits on the board of Corporation 3, then Corporations 1 and
3 are linked in two steps. Davis discovered that, in 1999,
97.4% of all corporations in his sample group of 811 Fortune
1000 firms could be linked to Chase Manhattan in four
steps or fewer.116 One of the most "connected" directors,
Vernon Jordan, served on nine boards with 106 other
directors. 167
Finally, although this benefit is impossible to quantify,
board memberships are very prestigious. Large public
corporations are, in a sense, the Ivy League of the business
world. Membership in the governing body of such
163. Id. at 133-34 (explaining that American Express and W.R. Grace have
adopted policies against awarding consulting contracts to directors).
164. See Gerald F. Davis et al., The Small World of the American Corporate
Elite, 1982-2001, 1 STRATEGIC ORG. 301-26 (2003).
165. "Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon" is a game popularized by the internet in
which players attempt to link random movie stars to Kevin Bacon through
movies. For example, to link Kevin Bacon to Dustin Hoffman requires at most
two degrees. Kevin Bacon appeared in A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures
1992) with Tom Cruise, who co-starred with Dustin Hoffman in RAIN MAN
(MGM 1988).
166. See Davis et al., supra note 164, at 320.
167. Id. at 304. The interconnectedness of boards is also the subject of the
website www.theyrule.net, which permits users to explore how companies are
connected through overlapping board members.
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institutions cloaks directors in credibility that can be
leveraged to obtain other positions in government or
business.
Upon hearing of the tremendous benefits associated
with board membership, one might think that corporate
directorships are very demanding jobs. But the opposite is
actually the case. The average corporate director spends
less than 160 hours per year on board business, including
travel time.168 That equates to roughly three weeks of
work.169
The tremendous tangible and intangible benefits of
directorship contrasted with the relatively insignificant
amount of work demanded produces powerful incentives to
retain a membership position. I do not mean to argue that
all corporate directors are bought and paid for management
lackeys. But even directors of great integrity may find that
arguments become more powerful when implicitly linked to
munificent benefits. It would be naive to think that the
rewards for compliance lurking in the background of every
boardroom discussion have no effect on director decision-
making.
C. Board's Resource Constraints
Further complicating independent directors' efforts to
monitor the CEO are the resource constraints they face.
These include limited time, staff, information, agenda, and,
perhaps most importantly, incentive.
As just discussed, directorships are considered part-
time work; board members of major corporations spend an
average of 157 hours per year fulfilling their directorial
168. See EISENBERG, supra note 89, at 147 ("[O]utside directors spend an
average of 157 hours a year on board matters, including preparation time and
travel time."); see also Bogus, supra note 45, at 35 n.184 (citing a 1988 survey
showing how directors spend about 108 hours per year on board-related
activity, including travel time); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule
and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1481
(1984) (citing a 1982 survey demonstrating that directors of publicly held
companies spend about 123 hours per year, including travel, on work as
director).
169. Consider that it is quite common for a New York corporate lawyer to
bill over 2400 hours per year or over 200 hours per month (assuming a few
weeks of annual vacation). Even if 90% of hours worked are billable (a number
that in my experience would be somewhat high), 157 hours translates into less
than three weeks of work for a corporate lawyer.
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duties.17 ° Corporate officers, in contrast, invest the bulk of
their work hours in corporate business. This time
discrepancy grants an enormous advantage to officers in
any dispute between management and the board. The CEO
and other members of the management team have many
times the work hours available with which to conduct
market surveys, consult experts, formulate strategy, and
create persuasive presentations. Management also enjoys
the luxury of greater focus on the corporation. While other
occupations take up the bulk of directors' time and
attention, management's most important career priority
remains the corporation.
This time advantage compounds when we add in the
staff differential. The entire corporate hierarchy supports
management's efforts, but directors generally do not have
any staff at all devoted to their board-related activities.171
The resulting ratio of total work hours available to
management compared to the board's work resources will
generally exceed 100:1 and could exceed 1000:1.172 While the
board could theoretically also draw on corporate employees,
such employees are unlikely to be willing to oppose the
management team that determines their employment
futures, short of a looming change in control. The board
could also hire outside assistance such as management
consultants, but board members can be expected to feel
some reluctance to hire large teams of outside experts, of a
size capable of matching management's personnel
advantage. Taking on the expense of what amounts to a
170. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
171. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 609 (1982) (explaining that the
Corporate Directors' Guidebook does not recommend regular staffing for non-
management directors); see also Edward D. Rogers, Striking the Wrong Balance:
Constituency Statutes and Corporate Governance, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 777, 793
(1994) ("[Corporations and commentators have largely rejected proposals to
provide staffs to boards of directors.").
172. Consider, for example, a corporation whose board consists of twelve
outside directors, and whose management team employs 100 staff members. If
the board members devote an above-average 150 hours per year to corporate
business, they would have a total of 1800 work hours available to them
annually. Even if the management staff works only 45 hours per week, the
corporate officers could draw on 225,000 work hours, a multiple of 125. If we
included all of middle-management in the corporate officers' side of the ledger,
swelling their numbers to at least 1000 staff members in large corporations, the
ratio would approximate 1250:1.
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second management team demonstrates profound lack of
trust in existing management. Given the likely impact of
this message on both the equity markets and the board-
management relationship, a rational board will take such
an action only when faced with a corporate crisis.
Theoretically, the board is entitled to any corporate
information it desires.'73 In practice, however, management
controls the flow of information. Hostile corporate officers
will often succeed in frustrating directors' efforts to obtain
relevant data.'74 In addition, the board's limited numbers
imply limited fields of expertise. Celebrity directors-who
are often academics or former politicians-will be
particularly likely to lack relevant knowledge and skills. In
contrast, management already has in its employ numerous
experts on the corporation's business. While the board could
employ outside experts, outsiders will not have access to the
same level of information that the management team will.
Management will generally have the ability to manipulate
the flow of information to its advantage.
Management can further deflect board opposition
through its influence on the board's agenda. Since
management commands superior knowledge of the issues
facing the corporation, it would be reasonable for a board to
defer to management's greater knowledge in deciding how
to allocate its scarce time. By keeping the board's attention
focused elsewhere, management may distract the directors
from issues that threaten the officers' control.
Perhaps the greatest threat to the board's effective
monitoring of management is the absence of any strong
financial incentive for the directors to investigate or oppose
management. Directors' pecuniary incentive to monitor the
corporation could stem from either their pay packages or
from the threat of liability. Neither has proven effective in
instilling a sufficiently powerful incentive to oppose
management. Directors' pay packages, even in the rare
cases when composed entirely of stock in the corporation,
173. See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(d) (2001) ("Any director.., shall
have the right to examine the corporation's stock ledger, a list of its
stockholders and its other books and records for a purpose reasonably related to
the director's position as a director."); Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d
125, 128 (Del. Ch. 1969) ("A director of a Delaware corporation has the right to
inspect corporate books and records; that right is correlative with his duty to
protect and preserve the corporation.").
174. See EISENBERG, supra note 89, at 147.
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lack the magnitude to create adequate incentives. For
example, imagine a director who has served on the
company's board for ten years, earning $100,000 in the
corporation's stock each year as payment. With some
appreciation, the director might own as much as $1,600,000
in company stock.175 This director owns a significant equity
stake in the company, which should correspond to a
powerful incentive to monitor management behavior. As the
company flourishes, the value of the director's stock will
increase.
The problem with this theory is that the director's
economic interest in retaining his or her position will
outweigh all but the most dramatic effects on this equity
stake. The present value of $100,000 per year over the next
ten years, assuming a discount rate of 5%, is nearly
$800,000,1"6 or just about half the director's equity stake.
Suppose the corporation is faced with an important
decision, and that the director believes that management's
plan will result in a reduction in the corporation's stock
price of 20%. Suppose further that, as argued above,
managers will refuse to renominate any director that
opposes their policies.177 If the director decides to oppose
management and succeeds, he or she will have averted a
$320,000 loss. But that director will also lose the future
stream of income from his or her position as a board
member, a cost of nearly $800,000. Faced with this choice, a
rational director will accede to management's desires,
preferring a loss of $320,000 to a loss of $800,000, especially
given the chance that a director who opposes management
may lose his or her seat on the board while still failing to
reverse management's policies, a $1,120,000 loss. Unless
175. If we assume the stock appreciates steadily at 10% per year, then an
income of $100,000 in stock per year for ten years would amount to just shy of
$1,600,000, ignoring taxes and dividends and assuming the director never sells




177. It is rational for managers to dispose of directors who oppose their
policies. Even if some particular policy advanced by an opposing director would
benefit the corporation, the independence signaled by opposition may also apply
to decisions on the manager's future employment with the company. From the
CEO's perspective, it would take a rare combination of massive stock ownership
by the CEO and tremendous benefits from some particular policy change to
make such a truly independent board worth the risk to the CEO's job security.
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the issue before the corporation is the sort of "bet the
company" decision that could result in a decline (or
increase) in the company's stock value of 50% or more, or a
potential change in corporate control,'78 this hypothetical
director will comply with management's wishes.
This example illustrates the notion that because the
effect of any particular decision on a director's equity stake
will rarely outweigh the director's interest in retaining his
or her position, board members' pay packages will not
generally succeed in encouraging rational directors to
oppose management's interests.
D. Compensation-Specific Problems
Thus far, we have discussed why board members might
generally tend to defer to management's decisions, in the
absence of a corporate crisis. There are reasons to believe,
however, that directors will be particularly likely to comply
with the CEO's requests in the compensation context.
Directors' incentives to resist management are weaker
when making CEO compensation decisions, and such
decisions are particularly easy to rationalize.
A rational CEO may care more about his or her own
compensation than about any other corporate decision. It is
hard to imagine any other area in which the CEO's
interests are so directly at stake. In the arena of CEO pay,
not only do the rewards of opposition appear small, but the
risks are particularly great. CEOs are unlikely to forgive a
director who suggests the corporation should be paying less
for the chief executive's services. It is unlikely that the
CEO's compensation package will appear nearly as
important to the corporation as to the CEO. As a result,
even truly independent and extremely conscientious board
members may well feel their time and political capital are
better spent fighting for favored business strategy
decisions. More self-interested directors will surely shun
the high-risk, low-reward strategy of resisting the CEO's
compensation desires.
Moreover, directors can easily rationalize the amount of
pay both to themselves and shareholders by using
178. In the case of a change in control, the director's incentives will depend




compensation consultants or pay structures that appear
performance-based. As part of the pay-setting process,
many corporations involve compensation consultants. These
consultants-who are most often hired by the CEO-
compile compensation surveys, showing CEO pay scales at
comparable corporations. No board of directors-and
certainly no CEO-should believe that its corporation's
chief deserves less than average pay; after all, boards hire
CEOs because of their outstanding, well-above-average
credentials. One can easily see how a tendency to pay even
slightly above average salaries can quickly result in a
dramatic ratcheting of the compensation of large
corporation CEOs."9
Board members can also justify large pay packages by
making most of the pay appear to be performance related,
using tools such as options, without actually linking pay to
management's performance. As explained above, however,
options reward executives for the corporation's overall
performance-or that of the relevant market sector-
without regard to any particular manager's contribution to
achieving that performance. 80 Options therefore function
poorly as means to induce performance by individual
managers. Paying executives in restricted stock poses
similar problems.
Board members therefore have numerous tools at their
disposal with which they can satisfy CEOs' compensation
demands while rationalizing both to themselves and to the
shareholders the resulting overlarge payments. The ease of
rationalization using apparently performance-based pay
and employing compensation consultants, combined with
the high-risk, low-reward nature of compensation
challenges, can be expected to result in board members
experiencing even greater reluctance to challenge CEOs in
the compensation context.
179. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 48, at 790 ("It is widely understood that
the methodology of compensation consultants and boards in devising
compensation plans results in a 'ratcheting up' of salaries."); Yablon, supra note
46, at 1878 ("It is not difficult to see how, in a world in which every CEO
believes he should be paid at or around the seventy-fifth percentile of the range
of compensation levels developed by the compensation consultant, a strong
upward pressure on compensation will result.").
180. See supra notes 92-97.
181. See supra notes 98-102.
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E. CEOs Hired from Outside the Corporation
Although the pressures just described warp the
compensation-setting process for existing CEOs, and
perhaps for CEOs promoted from within the company, what
about CEOs hired from outside? An outside candidate has
not selected the directors, nor has such a candidate had the
time to develop relationships with the board members.
Despite the absence of these advantages, there is data that
suggests that outside candidates for the position of CEO
succeed in negotiating higher compensation packages than
inside candidates."2 Kevin Murphy has argued that this
data demonstrates the fallacy of the notion that boards are
captured.183
To the contrary, this data is entirely consistent with the
theory that boards are captured. First, the board members
all possess a powerful incentive to please the person who
will become the new CEO. If the existing board members
wish to retain their positions, they must quickly establish
relationships with the new chief executive. Paying the new
CEO an extraordinary amount of money is a quick and easy
method of creating goodwill. In fact, this dynamic may help
explain why outside candidates are paid more than inside
candidates: board members already have some relationship
with inside candidates, so they do not need to pay inside
candidates as large a "greeting gift." Second, the board
members will have the same incentive to avoid antagoniz-
ing an outside candidate over compensation issues that may
appear relatively unimportant items on the corporate
agenda as they do to avoid angering inside candidates.
Third, even if the board members are not friends of the
outside candidate, many of the directors will still be CEOs
with an interest in raising average CEO compensation.
Finally, as Bebchuk et al. have argued, the flaws in the
negotiating process with existing CEOs and inside
candidates distort the market for CEO compensation
generally.' Outside candidates must be lured away from
182. See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial




CEOs hired from the outside who at the time of their hiring are CEOs
of other firms are likely to be using their power at those firms to
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companies where they already have established the
advantages of entrenchment. They will rationally refuse to
leave a company whose board they have captured unless
paid a great deal more than they are earning already.18
This section has argued that boards are to a great
degree captured by CEOs, making them largely biddable on
executive compensation issues and setting up the market
failure that generates the executive compensation problem.
Now that the article has discussed the nature of the
problem and the need for an alternative approach to
solutions, it will next explore altruistic theory in Part III,
before attempting to apply it to executive compensation in
Part IV.
III. ALTRUISTIC THEORY
The free market solution to agency problems such as
those posed by executive compensation is to institute
mechanisms that better align agents' incentives with those
of their principals, taking agents' preferences"' as a given."'
Popular devices such as options, performance bonuses, and
restricted stock, as well as proposed reforms such as
indexed options, 8 ' all fall into this incentives category. 189
extract rents. Thus, the hiring firm cannot attract them without
compensating them for whatever rents they currently enjoy and must
give up to take the new positions.
Bebchuk et al., supra note 48, at 842.
185. Id.
186. One of the fundamental assumptions of economics is that individuals
are capable of transitively ordering their choices. For example, a person faced
with a choice among mint chip, peanut butter, and cookie dough ice cream
should be able to rank these choices in a transitive order. If Mary prefers mint
chip to peanut butter, and peanut butter to cookie dough, she will necessarily
prefer mint chip to cookie dough. These rankings are sometimes termed
"preferences." See generally Sidney Schoeffler, Note on Modern Welfare
Economics, 42 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 881 (1952); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools:
A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 317, 322-323 (1977).
187. See, e.g., Elson II, supra note 99, at 943 (explaining that the directors'
interests must be aligned with those of shareholders through the grant of
restricted stock); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 883-92 (attempting to
activate institutional investors, who as large shareholders should share most of
the policy preferences of stockholders as a whole).
188. Indexed options adjust their exercise prices to some relevant market
index in an attempt to adjust for general market movements that have little to
do with the performance of the corporation itself.
189. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The regulatory approach attempts to force individuals to act
against their initial preferences by imposing large costs on
behavior that is not considered socially desirable. 0
An alternative approach is to employ the insights of
behavioral law and economics to modify agents' preferences,
making them want to choose socially desirable actions.
Preference-shaping offers the possibility of sharply reduced
agency costs. Agents who want to do what is best for their
principals should not require large payments to induce
them to act in their principals' interests. One promising
source of preference modification is altruistic theory. This
section explores altruistic theory with a view toward
applying that theory to help resolve corporate governance
problems generally, and the problem of executive
compensation in particular.
A. Definitions and Root Causes of Altruistic Behavior
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language defines "altruism" as "[c]oncern for the welfare of
others, as opposed to egoism; selflessness."'' This definition
accords with popular views of altruism. We tend to think of
altruism as unselfish behavior, acts that involve bearing
costs solely for another's benefit. Examples of such behavior
range from giving gifts or making charitable donations to
risking one's own life to save another's.
In contrast to the popular sense of altruism, most
disciplines that study altruism empirically have ascribed
selfish motives for acts normally considered altruistic.
Sociobiologists have ascribed such behavior to "selfish
genes," arguing that it may sometimes be in a gene's
interest to produce altruistic-appearing behavior in the
animals in which it resides.'92 Economists have similarly
190. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
191. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 39
(William Morris ed., 1969).
192. As Richard Dawkins has written:
[A] predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless
selfishness. This gene selfishness with usually give rise to selfishness
in individual behaviour [sic]. However, as we shall see, there are
special circumstances in which a gene can achieve its own selfish goals
best by fostering a limited form of altruism at the level of individual
animals. 'Special' and 'limited' are important words in the last
sentence. Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love
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argued that individuals behave from selfish motives, and
that altruistic behavior must therefore stem from perceived
individual advantages.' Psychologists have, along the
same lines, mostly contended that altruists are motivated
by a desire to terminate negative arousal stemming from
perceptions of people in distress.' Some psychologists,
however, have argued that true, empathy-motivated
altruism does exist.
Because all three of these disciplines largely ascribe
selfish motives to altruistic acts, the popular, motivational,
definition of altruism lacks usefulness. Defining altruism as
an act motivated by empathy, or "[c]oncern for the welfare
of others,"'96 describes a phenomenon that most experts
believe does not exist. Instead, empirical researchers have
often found it more useful to define altruism behaviorally,
without regard to the underlying motivation. Richard
Dawkins, perhaps the most prominent sociobiologist of the
past few decades, has thus defined an altruistic entity as
one that "behaves in such a way as to increase another such
entity's welfare at the expense of its own." '197 Dawkins
stresses that this definition ignores motivation altogether.
As he has written:
It is important to realize that the above definitions of altruism and
selfishness are behavioural, not subjective. I am not concerned
here with the psychology of motives. I am not going to argue about
and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts that simply do
not make evolutionary sense.
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 2 (1989).
193. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Geentic Fitness:
Economics and Sociobiology, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 817, 822 (1976) ("[Aln egoist has
an incentive to try to simulate altruism whenever altruistic behavior increases
his own consumption through its effect on the behavior of others."); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Altruism in Law and Economics, 68 AM. ECON.
REV. 417, 419 (1978) (explaining that altruists make wealth transfers to
strangers to gain reward of favorable publicity); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS 49-67 (2000) (explaining the existence of gifts and gratuitous
promises as devices used to signal possession of a low discount rate).
194. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 43-46 (explaining that most
psychologists believe altruistic behavior is rooted in attempts to reduce negative
arousal or some other egoistic explanation); Dovidio, supra note 32, at 410
(arguing that the literature generally supports the "economic man" approach).
195. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 109-174 (describing studies supporting
the existence of empathy-driven altruism).
196. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra
note 191, at 39.
197. DAWKINS, supra note 192, at 4.
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whether people who behave altruistically are 'really' doing it for
secret or subconscious selfish motives. Maybe they are and maybe
they aren't, and maybe we can never know, but in any case that is
not what this book is about. My definition is concerned only with
whether the effect of an act is to lower or raise the survival




I will adopt Dawkins' behavioral definition of altruism,
though without the focus on genetic survival. For the
purposes of this article, I will use the term "altruistic" to
describe behavior that requires the "donor" to bear at least
short-run costs in order to produce at least a short-run
benefit to the "donee," where the costs and benefits involved
are material rather than psychic.
I adopt the behavioral definition of altruism both to
accord with theorists in other disciplines 9 9 and in order to
provide for clarity in behavior labeling. We can directly
observe actions and determine whether they appear to
involve the actor's bearing short-run costs while assisting
another. But, absent Judge Learned Hand's famous mind-
reading bishops,' ° we cannot easily discern the actor's
motivation or intent, or whether short-run costs are being
borne in quest of long-term gains.'
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Kanungo & Conger, supra note 32, at 242-43.
Since it is often difficult to identify the helper's dispositional
intentions, researchers have preferred to define altruism as a form of
overt behavior that benefits others. In this sense, altruism as a
behavioral construct has a broader scope which includes many forms of
prosocial behavior (cooperation, helping, charity, empowering, and so




A contract is an obligation attached by mere force of law to certain acts
of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and
represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty
bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended something
else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he
would still be held, unless there was some mutual mistake, or
something else of the sort.
Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
201. But see BATSON, supra note 32, at 109-74 (attempting to prove through
experimentation that some altruistic behavior is motivated by empathy).
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B. Factors Correlating with Altruistic Behavior
The numerous empirical studies performed exploring
altruistic behavior have identified a series of factors that
correlate with altruism. Although correlation does not prove
causation, the volume and variety of the studies may lend
us some confidence that we may successfully induce
altruistic behavior by taking advantage of some or all of
these factors. Researchers have formulated a number of
different theories for why people sometimes behave
altruistically, and we are very far from anything even
approaching a consensus on this causation question.
Although a better understanding of altruism's root causes
would certainly be very helpful, the current indeterminacy
of the answer does not close off altruism's usefulness to
social science in general or to law in particular.
We can divide the correlative factors into three groups:
perceptive, internal, and external. Perceptive factors
involve individuals' discernment of their environment.
Thus, people are more likely to behave altruistically when
their perception of the need is particularly clear,2  when
they believe they are capable of rendering assistance,203 and
when they are similar to or have some relationship with the
person in need leading to empathy.2°4 Enhancing such
perception may increase the odds of altruistic behavior.0 5
Internal factors consist of the emotions, moods, or traits
of the potential altruists. They include the salience of social
norms advocating helping behavior ("helping norms"),2 6 a
sense of responsibility for the person in need, 0 ' feelings of
happiness or high self-esteem, 28 and the possession of
certain personality traits.2 9  Manipulating the actor's
202. See supra note 33.
203. See supra note 34.
204. See supra note 35.
205. See supra notes 33-35.
206. See supra note 36.
207. See supra note 37.
208. See supra note 38.
209. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 177-201; Carlo et al., supra note 32, at
456-57 (citing a study that demonstrates how both personality traits and
environmental factors are important in predicting altruistic behavior); KOHN,
supra note 32, at 76-82 (discussing personality traits that influence altruistic
behavior such as self-esteem, assertiveness, interpersonal skills, and political
beliefs); Korsgaard et al., supra note 32, at 161-62 (attaching less importance to
personal consequnces of social information and exhibiting greater reluctance to
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environment to foster or select for these internal factors
may increase the incidence of altruistic behavior.21 °
External factors affect the likelihood of altruistic
behavior through situational characteristics. These include
the expected utility of helping versus ignoring the person in
need, the relative ease of escape (either physically or
through coping mechanisms), 212 and the extent to which
external forces perceptibly attempt to coerce helping
behavior.213 Contextual changes may be arranged that
strengthen altruism's likelihood.
engage in rational calculations); J. Philippe Rushton, The Altruistic Personality:
Evidence from Laboratory, Naturalistic, and Self-Report Perspectives, in
DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 271-87 (Ervin Staub
et al. eds., 1984) (marshalling evidence supporting the existence of a trait of
altruism); Staub, supra note 32, at 138-39 (discussing how prosocial
orientation-a positive view of human beings, concern about other people's
welfare, and a feeling of personal responsibility for others' welfare-correlates
with altruism). But see Schwartz, supra note 32, at 272-73 (claiming that the
evidence argues against the existence of an altruistic personality).
210. See supra notes 36-38, 207.
211. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 88-89; Batson & Coke, supra note 32, at
176-77 (arguing that costs reduce the likelihood of altruism); Becker, supra note
193, at 822 (demonstrating how altruism is rooted in an attempt to secure
gains); Dovidio, supra note 32, at 410 ("[Pleople tend to behave as if to minimize
costs and maximize rewards."); EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 198-99 (explaining
that expected utility is a factor in deciding whether to behave altruistically);
POSNER, supra note 193, at 49-67 (giving gifts is a part of a cost-maximizing
attempt to signal possession of a low discount rate); Schwartz, supra note 32, at
241 (assessing costs is the first step in defending against demands of the
needy); Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32, at 235 ("People do not help when
the cost-benefit analysis clearly opposes the possible helping actions."); Norman
Frohlich et al., Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism, and Difference
Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 15 (1984) ("[T]he costs involved...
affect preferences for the realization of moral goals much as prices affect the
demand for consumer goods."); Korsgaard et al., supra note 32, at 161-62
(explaining that people who are less likely to calculate costs are more likely to
engage in altruistic behavior); and Landes & Posner, supra note 193, at 419
(explaining that altruism stems from an attempt to obtain a reward of favorable
publicity).
212. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 104-05, 110, 112-27; Dovidio, supra note
32, at 399-400 (demonstrating the diffusion of responsibility as a method of
escape); Schwartz, supra note 32, at 264 (explaining that excessive pressure
may provoke escape through, inter alia, denial of need); and Schwartz &
Howard, supra note 32, at 203-07 (explaining escape through coping
mechanisms such as denial of need, denial of effective action, denial of personal
ability, and denial of responsibility).
213. See Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32, at 207-08 (explaining the
"boomerang effect").
SOFTENING PHARAOH'S HEART
1. Perceptive Factors. Most theorists agree that a clear
perception of need is a necessary or at least usual
prerequisite of altruistic behavior.214 C. Daniel Batson, one
of the leading altruism theorists, has pointed out that
perception of need is "a threshold function of (a) a
perceptible discrepancy between the other's current and
potential states on some dimension(s) of well-being, (b)
sufficient salience of these states, and (c) the perceiver's
attention being focused on the other. 2 11 In other words,
helping behavior correlates with the degree to which
another's situations could be greatly improved, the
conspicuousness of this potential change, and the extent to
which the actor notices this discrepancy between the other's
actual and potential states of well-being. The potential
altruist will not think to offer assistance if he or she fails to
perceive the would-be donee's need, so need perception is a
gate-keeping factor. 216 Helping behavior should increase
with the clarity of the need for assistance and the putative
donor's receptivity to need cues.2"7 Once need awareness
passes some initial threshold, the likelihood of helping
behavior increases with the intensity and clarity of the need
for help.1 8
Thus, one study demonstrated that people were more
likely to donate an organ after hearing a detailed
description of the problems of those requiring bone-marrow
transplants. 29 The description of the need amplified the
need's clarity making altruistic behavior more likely.
In addition, many scholars have argued that potential
altruists will be more likely to render assistance when they
believe they are capable of helping effectively.22 Belief in at
least three different types of competence is important to
214. See sources cited supra note 33.
215. BATSON, supra note 32, at 83.
216. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 241 (describing need perception as an
"activation step").
217. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 242 ("The variables which influence
initial awareness of need are the prominence of the need in the environment, its
clarity, and individual receptivity to need cues."); Schwartz & Howard, supra
note 32, at 232-33 ("Situational salience and clarity of need as well as individual
receptivity to need cues increase awareness of need.").
218. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 243 (intensity); and KOHN, supra note
32, at 71 (clarity).
219. See EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 194.
220. See sources cited supra note 34.
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induce helping behavior.221 The potential altruist must
possess "a general belief in one's ability to influence events
and successfully pursue goals; the capacity to generate
plans of action or the knowledge of action on specific
occasions; and specific competence to act in required ways
(such as the ability to swim in order to save a drowning
person)." '222 Social competence may also be important.2"
Socially inhibited individuals may refrain from helping out
of fear of embarrassment.224
Intuitively, the link between ability to help and
tendency to help seems obvious. The tangible and psychic
rewards associated with rendering assistance are at least
partly linked to success in alleviating the donee's distress.
In addition, when competence stems from experience,
familiarity with the situation and knowledge of the
appropriate response may also encourage helping behavior.
Thus, we would expect higher percentages of doctors to offer
the victim treatment in accidents, of police officers to assist
in stopping crimes even when off-duty, and of off-duty or
retired fire fighters to race into burning buildings in search
of victims.
In one study supporting a relationship between
competence and altruism, subjects were told that their
responses could help a victim of electric shock.22 While
generally the speed of response varied with the degree of
the victim's suffering, subjects who were told their
responses could not help did not respond more quickly as
the victim's suffering increased.2 Instead, these subjects
invested more time in attempting to distract themselves
from perceiving the victim's anguish.227
Although studies have been performed on this factor,2
there is not a great deal of supporting empirical data,2
221. See Staub, supra note 32, at 144.
222. Id.
223. See EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 207.
224. See id.
225. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 246.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Shalom H. Schwartz, The Justice of Need and the Activation of
Humanitarian Norms, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 111, 119-20 (1975) (citing several
studies supporting role of competence in activation of humanitarian norms).
229. See id. at 119 (describing research evidence for the impact of actual
ability on responsiveness as "sparse"); Schwartz, supra note 32, at 245
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perhaps because this relationship seems so clear.2 31 Until
more studies can be done measuring the importance of this
factor, we should incorporate it into models only with great
caution.
A third perceptive factor often linked to altruism is
some similarity or relationship between the potential
altruist and the person in need.2 31 This factor operates
through its effect on empathy, an emotional response
appropriate to someone else's situation rather than to one's
own. Empathy is widely believed to play an important
role in inducing altruism, either selflessly, through an
internalization of others' needs, or egoistically, through an
aversive reaction to negative arousal.
People are more likely to feel empathy for a person who
is similar to them or with whom they have some
relationship. 234 The greater the perceived similarity and the
closer the relationship, the stronger the empathic response
experienced by the potential altruist.23 Batson has argued
that similarity enhances empathy by boosting one's ability
to take the perspective of another.2 6 Empathy, Batson
contends, is a function of both a natural ability to put
oneself in another's shoes and the "perspective-taking set,"
knowledge gleaned from various sources that allows a
person to imagine how someone else is feeling.2 37 The
perspective-taking set can be expanded by experience
instruction, or a feeling of attachment to the other.239
Feelings of attachment in turn come from either direct
contact or from generalizations based on contact with
(describing research evidence supporting link between perceived ability to help
and helping behavior as "meager").
230. But see EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 196 (arguing that a perceived
ability to help may not be a prerequisite to assistance in emergencies, because
people may help before thinking through the situation).
231. See sources cited supra note 35.
232. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 51, 56, 113-17, 177; see also Rushton,
supra note 209, at 271 (defining empathy as "experiencing the emotional state
of another.").
233. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 47-51, 54-58, 83-90.
234. See id.; Staub, supra note 32, at 142 ("[P]eople respond more
empathically to similar others, even if the similarity is limited in nature.").
235. See sources cited supra note 232.





similar people.239 Attachments grounded in generalizations
are generally weaker than those based on personal
contact. 240
Some experimental support for the notion that altruism
is more likely to the extent there is a similarity or
relationship between the potential donor and donee comes
from a study by Harvey A. Hornstein.2 4' Hornstein dropped
unsealed envelopes around Manhattan that contained a
wallet and a letter. The letter indicated that the author had
discovered the wallet and planned to mail it back to the
owner. The clear implication was that the letter's author
had dropped the package while on the way to the post office.
Some letters described the author as similar to most of the
package finders, while others described the author as
rather different. In addition, in some letters the author
expressed annoyance at the trouble involved in returning
the lost wallet, but in others the author appeared pleased
about the opportunity to do a good deed. Package finders
who read the "similar" letter were much more likely to take
on the emotion expressed than those who read the letter
describing the author as someone relatively alien to the
finder.2 4' Thus for "similar" letters, if the letter expressed
positive feelings, the finder was much more likely to mail
the package than if the letter expressed negative feelings. 43
In contrast, the emotions described by dissimilar authors
had no impact on the incidence of helpful behavior.2" This
result indicates that people are more likely to identify with
those perceived to be similar to them.
2. Internal Factors. There are four internal factors that
affect altruism. The first is the salience of helping norms. 5
People tend to behave more altruistically when the social
rules requiring prosocial behavior are especially apparent.
Salience may contribute to altruistic behavior by clarifying
239. See id. at 85.
240. See id.
241. See Hornstein, supra note 32, at 31-36; see also Berkowitz, supra note
32, at 87 (discussing Hornstein's study).
242. See Hornstein, supra note 32, at 31-36; see also Berkowitz, supra note
32, at 87.
243. See Hornstein, supra note 32, at 35.
244. See id.
245. See sources cited supra note 36.
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the benefits to be derived from helping others.246 These
rewards may include a likelihood of inducing reciprocal
assistance at a later time from this donee or from others, an
enhanced reputation for trustworthiness, social approba-
tion, and emotional satisfaction, among others. Salience
may also boost empathy by reminding potential altruists of
the importance attached by the culture to other people and
the consequent need to attempt perspective-taking.
Leonard Berkowitz and Louise R. Daniels constructed a
two-phase study to test whether boosting the salience of
helping norms increased the incidence of altruistic
behavior.248 In the first phase, the subjects were assigned a
preliminary task.249 Half the subjects were assisted by a
peer who was actually the experimenters' confederate,
while the other subjects received no help. 5° Afterwards, the
subjects were assigned a second task, supervised by a
different supposed peer.2"' The experimenters told half the
subjects the supervisor's reward depended on the subject's
performance (the "dependent group"), and the other half
that there was no relationship between the subject's
performance and the supervisor's reward (the "independent
group").5 Among the dependent group, subjects who had
received assistance in the first phase tended to try harder
to perform the second task,5 presumably because receiving
assistance in the first phase had reminded them of the
social norm that requires some degree of altruistic
behavior.254
246. See Hornstein, supra note 32, at 30.
247. See generally id. at 30-31 (discussing the efffect of a model that
demonstrates how people are expected to behave).
248. See Leonard Berkowitz & Louise R. Daniels, Affecting the Salience of
the Social Responsibility Norm: Effects of Past Help on the Response to
Dependency Relationships, 68 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 275, 276-77 (1964).
249. See id. at 276.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 276-77.
252. See id. at 277.
253. See id. at 280.
254. See id. at 280-81. Another study demonstrating the importance of the
salience of helping norms involved inducing children to share winnings from a
game with poor children. Some of these children were told they had helped
because they were the kind of people who help others (an "internal
attribution"), while others were told they had helped because the experimenter
wanted them to (an "external attribution"). Those children who were given an
internal attribution were more likely to help later than those given an external
attribution. A likely explanation for this difference is that helping norms were
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The second internal factor is the donor's sense of
responsibility for the person in need.255 A sense of
responsibility may stem from having caused the distress in
question, being placed in a position of authority or
accountability, possessing a unique ability to assist due to
specialized skills or physical position, being asked for help,
or from the victim's dependency.256 Responsibility or
dependency relationships may lead to a deeper emotional
attachment, fostering empathy.257 Skills or position-based
responsibility may also lead to altruistic behavior by
lowering the costs of helping, or by increasing the social
sanction of standing idle. 58 Responsibility rooted in direct
appeals may foster altruism by clarifying the need and
highlighting social helping norms.5
The Berkowitz-Daniels study described above also
demonstrated the efficacy of feelings of responsibility in
inducing altruistic behavior. 6 ' The second phase task
involved constructing paper boxes.261 In this second phase of
the study, half the subjects were told that their supervisor's
reward depended on their efforts (the "High Dependency"
condition).62 The other half were told that because
individual box-construction ability varied so greatly, the
experimenters would evaluate the supervisors only on the
clarity of the supervisors' orders and not on the number of
boxes completed (the "Low Dependency" condition).263 The
study found that High Dependency subjects tended to
produce significantly more boxes-controlling for ability-
more salient to those children given the internal attribution. See Dovidio, supra
note 32, at 382-83.
255. See sources cited supra note 37.
256. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 246-50.
257. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 85; Schwartz, supra note 32, at 246
("Responsibility refers to a sense of connection or relatedness with the person in
need.").
258. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 248.
259. Id. at 249 ("In addition to inducing responsibility, of course, appeals
may promote helping by drawing attention to the existence of a need,
overcoming ambiguity regarding its reality, and pointing to social expectations
for behavior.").
260. See Berkowitz & Daniels, supra note 248, at 280-81.
261. See id. at 276.
262. Id. at 277.
263. Id.
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than Low Dependency subjects,264 indicating that feelings of
responsibility tend to increase the incidence of altruism.
The third internal factor is the happiness or self-esteem
of the potential altruist.265  Joy and confidence may
encourage altruism by reducing self-absorption, opening the
potential altruist to the feelings and needs of others. 26 Too
much self-esteem, however, may interfere with self-
examination, preventing the actor from noticing flaws in his
or her behavior that require correction. 267 This factor does
not appear easy to manipulate in the corporate context.268
The fourth and final internal factor associated with
altruism is the possession of certain personality traits. 9
Researchers point to traits such as sympathy or empathy,
264. See id. at 278.
265. See sources cited supra note 38.
266. See Dovidio, supra note 32, at 398 (explaining that good moods direct
attention towards others, facilitating helping); Staub, supra note 32, at 145
("Positive experiences can free people of self-concern, which is often present to
some degree in social relationships.").
267. See EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 202-03 (discussing Staub's view);
Staub, supra note 32, at 145 (explaining that children with a very high self-
concept may feel self-sufficient and be less concerned with their connections
with others).
268. Interestingly, sadness may also increase altruistic behavior under
some circumstances. See Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 83-86; Dovidio, supra note
32, at 391-98; KOHN, supra note 32, at 73-75; Staub, supra note 32, at 144-46.
Melancholy may encourage altruistic behavior because an unhappy person has
a stronger motivation to find a method of elevating his or her mood. See
Dovidio, supra note 32, at 389 ("[Rlesearchers have suggested that people who
experience negative states help because it is perceived as a way of reducing
unpleasant arousal."). The emotional rewards of altruism may appear a
desirable remedy for the heavyhearted. See id; see also Berkowitz, supra note
32, at 83 (feeling guilt may motivate helpfulness, even if beneficiary is not the
source of the guilt). Sadness seems especially likely to motivate helping
behavior when the low mood has been caused by focus on the misfortunes of
others. See KOHN, supra note 32, at 73 ("[P]eople who feel sympathetic sadness
or guilt are often among the most likely to help."). In such cases, altruism may
prove a particularly potent cure. Note, however, that if the motivation consists
of a search for a general mood elevator, the beneficiary of the donor's altruistic
act may not be the same person whose misfortune caused the donor's
melancholy. See Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 83 ("[F]indings suggest the victim
of the injustice is not necessarily the preferred beneficiary for the expiatory
assistance."). Also, if sadness leads to too much self-reflection, the actor may be
too focused on his or her own troubles to perceive the needs of others, reducing
the likelihood of altruism. See KOHN, supra note 32, at 73 (feeling bad reduces
prosocial behavior because the subjects are preoccupied with their own state of
mind).
269. See sources cited supra note 209.
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feelings of personal responsibility for people's well-being, a
positive orientation toward others, and docility as
predictive of altruism.27 ° Few, if any, scholars claim that an
altruistic personality will always produce altruistic
behavior. Instead, these characteristics interact with
attributes of the environment.2 7' As noted researcher Alfie
Kohn has explained:
[Tiwo people in the same situation may have different motives for
helping, and one person may have different motives for helping in
each of two situations. Even if an altruistic personality or prosocial
orientation exists, this hardly means that someone so
characterized will rush to aid other people without taking
environmental factors into account. If nothing else, such basic
situational variables as whether helping is likely to bring rewards
(or reciprocity) will mediate the effects of dispositional helpfulness.
(The promise of a reward makes some people more likely to help
and others less likely; one needs to know something about the
person and the situation to make a prediction.) It has long been
part of the conventional wisdom in personality theory that the
salience of the cues provided by the environment largely
determines which of these two will be more useful in predicting
behavior: where the situational factors seem less clear cut,
272dispositional factors will become more relevant.
Some personality traits popularly believed to correlate
with, or cause, altruistic behavior surprisingly do not. For
example, religious belief does not strongly correlate with
270. See Rushton, supra note 209, at 278-79 (pointing to empathy,
perspective-taking, internalized rules of justice, social responsibility, honesty,
self-control, feelings of personal efficacy and well-being, integrity); Staub, supra
note 32, at 147 (pointing to moral value orientations, empathic potential, self-
concept, self-esteem, self-awareness, self-acceptance, competence, and role
taking); Carlo et al., supra note 32, at 450 (pointing to sympathy, social
responsibility, ascription of responsibility, and perspective taking); Korsgaard,
et al., supra note 32, at 161-62 (attaching less importance to personal
consequences of social information, reluctance to engage in rational calculations
regarding social information); Herbert A. Simon, Altruism and Economics, 83
AM. ECON. REV. 156, 157 (1993) (pointing to docility).
271. See KOHN, supra note 32, at 84; RUSHTON, supra note 32, at 55
("[Blehavior is the result of an interaction between personality and situational
factors."); Carlo et al., supra note 32, at 450 ("[Tlhose who support the notion of
an altruistic personality have suggested that there is a person-situation
interaction in regard to altruistic tendencies.").
272. KOHN, supra note 32, at 84.
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altruism.273 Gender also does not appear to correspond with
altruism in any significant way.2 There is evidence that
individuals adhering to progressive political beliefs,
however, do tend to exhibit more altruistic behavior.275
In one study demonstrating the interaction between
personality and the environment, the subject observed a
woman reading journalism students' descriptions of an
assault.276 The woman, the experimenters' confederate,
apparently became upset, explaining that the stories
reminded her of an assault she herself had suffered. 277 The
researchers then asked the subjects whether they would
take the woman's place.278 Subjects who agreed would need
to reschedule for a different time and place, without any
additional compensation in the form of class credit.2 9
Agreeing to take the confederate's place therefore involved
a substantial sacrifice of the subject's time. Subjects'
willingness to substitute for the confederate and bear this
added inconvenience correlated well with measured indexes
of altruistic personality traits, indicating that possession of
these traits was predictive of altruistic behavior.28 °
3. External Factors. There are three external factors
linked to altruistic behavior. The first external factor that
affects altruism-and arguably the most intuitive-is the
expected utility of helping.281 For economists, of course, cost-
benefit calculations lie at the root of all decisions, including
those labeled altruistic.82 It is not surprising, therefore,
that economists generally hold that helping behavior is
273. Id. at 79-80 ("[R]eligious faith appears to be neither necessary for one
to act prosocially nor sufficient to ensure such behavior; in fact, there is
virtually no connection one way or the other between religious affiliation or
belief and prosocial activities.").
274. Id. at 81-82 ("Those who believe that gender differences are the
exception in most sorts of helping behavior, and that the differences that do
turn up are generally slight, seem to have most of the evidence on their side.").
275. Id. at 80 ("[I]t would seem that beliefs or activism of the sort sometimes
called progressive are generally (though, of course, not exclusively) associated
with prosocial behavior.").




280. See id. at 453.
281. See sources cited supra note 211.
282. See sources cited supra note 193.
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more likely when the expected costs are low relative to the
expected benefits."' They have explained the apparent
contradiction of rational utility-maximizers knowingly
bearing costs for another's benefit by searching for hidden
benefits that might compensate actors who lend
assistance.284 Sociobiologists argue along the same lines,
though they tend to define cost and benefit in terms of
genetic survival rather than individual utility.285 Somewhat
more surprisingly, psychologists also highlight the
importance of expected cost to decisions about potential
altruistic acts. 286  For psychologists, as well as some
economists, costs and benefits consist not only of the
material, but also the emotional.287 Potential helpers must
283. See Becker, supra note 193, at 819 (explaining that an altruist will act
to maximize own (real) social income); Landes & Posner, supra note 193, at 418
(explaining that altruistic rescue may occur when cost of rescue is very low); cf.
POSNER, supra note 193, at 50-51 (explaining that expensive gifts constitute
more effective signals of low discount rates, but donor will spend minimum
amount necessary to distinguish his type).
284. See POSNER, supra note 193, at 51 (signaling altruist's low discount
rate); Becker, supra note 193, at 821 (linking consumption and inducing
cooperation through altruism); Landes & Posner, supra note 193, at 419
(desiring favorable publicity); Simon, supra note 270, at 156-57 (increasing
fitness through docility because of bounded rationality).
285. See DAWKINS, supra note 192, at 4; Becker, supra note 193, at 817-18
(discussing the work of E.O. Wilson); Landes & Posner, supra note 193, at 418-
19 (citing other biologists who argue that altruism may increase the likelihood
of the altruist's genes surviving).
286. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 78-82, 88-89; EISENBERG, supra note 32,
at 198-99 (explaining that expected utility is a factor in deciding whether to
behave altruistically); Batson & Coke, supra note 32, at 176-77 (noting that
costs reduce the likelihood of altruism); Dovidio, supra note 32, at 410 ("[Pleople
tend to behave as if to minimize costs and maximize rewards."); Schwartz,
supra note 32, at 241 (assessing cost is the first step in defense against
demands of needy); Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32, at 235 ("People do not
help when the cost-benefit analysis clearly opposes the possible helping
actions.").
287.
Costs for helping may include feelings of aversion that are likely to
arise when helping (e.g., if the victim is drunk or bloody, material
losses, possible physical harm, or loss of social approval and potential
social sanctions). These potential costs must be considered in light of
potential gains such as social approval or recognition for helping and
the avoidance of emotional costs (e.g., empathic arousal or personal
distress) for not helping.
EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 199 (citation omitted); LouIs KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 21 (2002) (noting that welfare
considerations include tastes for fairness);
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weigh the guilt, shame and embarrassment of refusing to
help against the contentment and self-esteem that result
from giving assistance, as well as more material concerns.288
When the sum total of these costs appears low compared to
the potential benefits for some particular helpful act, the
incidence of that act is predicted to be high. 8 Conversely,
when the total expected costs appear to outweigh the
expected benefits, relatively few acts of aid are expected. 9 °
Research has borne out the important impact of cost-
benefit analysis on decision-making. For example, Batson
conducted a series of studies in which the subject watched
the experimenter's confederate attempt various tasks.291
The experimenter would appear to periodically administer
an electric shock to the confederate. 92 After some time, the
researcher would ask the subject to voluntarily replace the
confederate, since the confederate appeared to be
The costs of helping (x) include the physical effort involved, the
unpleasantness endured as a result of continued exposure to the
other's distress, the unpleasant possibilities of becoming vulnerable to
subsequent requests for help or enmeshed in long legal proceedings,
and so forth. The costs of escaping (y) include the physical effort
involved in escaping from the need situation (often minimal) and, more
importantly, the feelings of guilt and shame one anticipates as a result
of knowing that the person in need is continuing to suffer.
Batson & Coke, supra note 32, at 176;
[Plersonal costs for helping.., involve negative outcomes directly
imposed on the benefactor for making a direct helping response. Injury,
effort, and embarrassment are examples of potential costs for helping.
The other category is costs for the victim not receiving help. It contains
two conceptually different subcategories. First, there are personal costs
for not helping, which are direct negative outcomes for the bystander
for failing to aid a victim. These include guilt and public censure.
Second, there are empathic costs for the victim receiving no help, which
are based primarily on the bystander's awareness of the victim's
continued distress. In particular, these empathic costs involve
internalizing the victim's need and distress as well as more
sympathetic and concerned feelings for the victim.
Dovidio, supra note 32, at 383-84; Schwartz, supra note 32, at 253-54 (noting
that the types of costs and benefits include social, physical, psychological, and
moral); Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32, at 235 (noting that people identify
the material, social, and psychological outcomes of helping behavior).
288. See EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 198-99; Batson & Coke, supra note
32, at 176.
289. See sources cited supra note 211.
290. See id.
291. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 113-19.
292. See id. at 113.
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experiencing an unusually strong reaction to the shocks.293
Batson manipulated the costs associated with refusing to
assist the confederate by varying the number of tasks the
subject would have to observe.29 Subjects who would have
to observe only a few tasks faced lower expected costs
associated with a refusal to help, since they would not have
to endure the confederate's apparent suffering for very long.
As predicted, the incidence of helping behavior shrank
when the costs of refusal were lowered, at least when
empathy was not artificially heightened.295
Another study found that divinity students were less
likely to stop to assist a groaning victim while on their way
to deliver a sermon on the Good Samaritan if they were
made to feel late (10% versus 63%).29
When the emotional costs of refusing assistance and the
material costs of rendering assistance are both high, or
when the cost-benefit calculation otherwise fails to yield a
definite recommendation, some psychologists predict the
use of one or more methods of escape.297 These psychologists
mostly embrace some form of egoistic altruism, motivated
by a desire to reduce negative arousal rather than a pure
devotion to the needs of others. Escape will not often satisfy
the desires of someone motivated by pure empathy; a true
concern for others will only be satisfied by actual
293. See id. at 114-15.
294. See id. at 114.
295. See id. at 116.
296. See RUSHTON, supra note 32, at 55.
297. See Dovidio, supra note 32, at 384 (explaining that when costs of
helping and not helping are both high and bystander therefore does not help,
bystander is predicted to escape by derogating the victim, denying personal
responsibility for intervention, or redefining the situation as one not requiring
assistance);
Conflict is experienced when anticipated moral costs for an action are
high and opposed by nonmoral costs: Compliance with activated
personal norms can satisfy feelings of moral obligation only at the risk
of incurring substantial social, physical, and/or psychological costs. One
way to escape this conflict is to neutralize the feelings of obligation, to
deactivate the norms by redefining the situation. Three general modes
of neutralization are inherent in the model presented here ...
[R]eassessment can lead to deactivation by denying the state of need
(its reality, seriousness), by denying responsibility, or by viewing
different actions or different implications of action as appropriate.
Schwartz, supra note 32, at 255.
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assistance. 298 The relative ease of escape constitutes the
second external factor affecting the likelihood of altruism.299
There are several methods of escape. The first and most
obvious is physical."' People experiencing negative arousal
from the sight of, for example, a homeless person shivering
on a street corner, can simply walk past. Avoidance in this
scenario is a much cheaper path to relief than assistance.
The other methods are psychological. One can reinterpret
the scenario as one not requiring intervention ("He likes
being homeless");..1  create psychological distance by
distinguishing between one's own situation and that of the
person in need ("That could never happen to me");0 2 refocus
one's attention elsewhere ("I hate the news, let's turn on a
sitcom"); 3 ascribe the situation to the fault of the person in
need ("This wouldn't have happened to her if she'd been
willing to work as hard as we do");30 4 remove oneself from
responsibility ("The government oprovides social programs
for people suffering this way");3 tout the virtues of the
well-off to explain their perquisites ("They earned every
298. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 88-89.
299. See sources cited supra note 212.
300. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 79-80.
301. See id.; see also EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 197; Dovidio, supra note
32, at 384; Schwartz, supra note 32, at 256; Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32,
at 236 ("A person may reexamine the situation, seeking cues that permit denial
of the need or at least a reduction in its perceived severity (e.g., 'That's not an
assault, it's a lovers' quarrel').").
302. See BATSON, supra note 32, at 80.
303. See id.
304. See RUSHTON, supra note 32, at 48 ("Persons witnessing harm done to
others (e.g., when they see others living in slum conditions) might restore a
sense of fairness by derogating the victim by convincing themselves that the
victim deserved to suffer."); Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 104 ("People are much
more willing to aid someone requiring assistance because of factors beyond his
control than a person whose dependency is his own fault."); Dovidio, supra note
32, at 384 ("[Dlerogate the victim .... ).
305. See EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 197; Dovidio, supra note 32, at 384;
Schwartz, supra note 32, at 256 ("Research on the phenomenon labeled
'diffusion of responsibility' postulates that situations are reassessed in order to
deny or reduce responsibility to act, thereby neutralizing felt obligation.");
[P]eople may deny their responsibility to conform with the moral or
social obligations: They may claim that under the circumstances these
personal or social norms do not reasonably apply. Denial of liability for
action is justified by such extenuating circumstances as provocation,
overwhelming outside pressure, job requirements, illness, and so on.
Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32, at 237.
876 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
penny they have");. 6 and deny one's ability to help
effectively ("Even if I gave this homeless person a dollar, it
wouldn't do any good; he'd just use it to buy drugs"). 0 7
Studies have demonstrated that personal norms ordaining
altruism correlate with helping behavior only among people
who tend to avoid the use of defense mechanisms."'
The third and final external factor affecting altruistic
behavior is the extent to which external forces perceptibly
attempt to coerce helping behavior.309 Altruists naturally
fear exploitation. 1 ' Their commitment to addressing the
needs of others exposes them to vulnerability to
opportunists.3 1 For example, imagine an altruist who wants
to support those who desire to work but cannot secure a job.
People who do not work because they do not want to work
may succeed in persuading such an altruist to give them
money by falsely claiming the source of their joblessness is
lack of opportunity, and not lack of desire or effort.
Altruists' suspicion may therefore be easily aroused,
particularly by claims that are overly forceful, dramatic, or
overtly manipulative. 2 Such demands for assistance may
306. See RUSHTON, supra note 32, at 48 ("Persons witnessing harm done to
others.., might restore a sense of fairness by... pointing to particular virtues
present in those who are particularly well off, thus suggesting that they deserve
their privileged positions.").
307. See EISENBERG, supra note 32, at 197 (denying competence to help);
Schwartz, supra note 32, at 256 ("It is also possible to neutralize feelings of
moral obligation by increasing the perceived seriousness of need and
reinterpreting the situations as beyond hope."); Schwartz & Howard, supra note
32, at 236 ("People may conclude from reexamining the situation that the action
in question would not be effective (e.g., 'No point intervening, they'll start up
again as soon as I leave').").
308. See Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32, at 237-38 ("Four separate
studies have found that personal norms correlate substantially with altruistic
behavior among people who tend not to deny responsibility, but that the
correlation is near zero among people high in responsibility denial.").
309. See supra note 213.
310. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 264 ("The special danger of altruistic
behavior is exploitation. In the absence of compensating social or material gains
for self-sacrifice, and without the protection of reciprocity, equity, or law, the
altruist may be drawn into an extensive sequence of demands.").
311. Id. ("Worse yet, altruists may discover that the needs to which they
responded were not genuine, that they were created or portrayed to gain
resources which the needy party could have sought through his own efforts.").
312.
Trust in the purity of need may also be undermined by actions
implying undue pressure or manipulativeness on the part of the person
seeking help. Hence conditions conducive to generating feelings of
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provoke what is sometimes termed a "boomerang effect," in
which potential altruists respond with resentment at
attempted impingements on their freedom of action rather
than with assistance.313 This reaction may in part be due to
altruists' anticipating being deprived of the emotional
rewards associated with helping others. 14 If altruists feel
that they were forced to assist, they may not experience the
boost in self-esteem associated with succoring others out of
apparent goodwill." ' The same dynamic may a'ply to offers
to pay potential altruists for their cooperation. One study
confirming this effect demonstrated that college students
were more likely to render assistance to someone in need if
they believed they were free to refuse aid than if they
thought they were compelled to help.317
moral obligation will promote altruistic behavior only so long as they
do not also induce suspicions that someone may be trying intentionally
to manipulate one's perceptions of a situation in order to elicit
emotions, images, value, or associations calculated to generate strong
feelings of personal obligation.
Id.
313.
If the critical threshold of pressure is traversed, feelings of moral
obligation will be reduced and altruistic helping will decrease because:
(1) the reality or seriousness of need may be denied; (2) the desire to
retain one's behavioral freedom by resisting pressure ... may be
stimulated; and (3) external pressure may be experienced as replacing
internalized motivation.
Id. (citation omitted),
314. Id. at 267-68 ("Dienstbier has suggested that [positive personal norms
predispose people to feel manipulated because] those most likely to perceive
their obligation and to respond after minimal pressure are denied the
opportunity to feel good about their altruism if they perceive themselves
virtually forced into the altruistic alternative.").
315. Id. at 264 ("When an appeal is overdone so that people perceive
themselves coerced toward the altruistic alternative, they feel deprived of the
self-satisfactions which are available when they act in response to their
internalized moral obligations.").
316. See Schwartz & Howard, supra note 32, at 252 (citing a study
demonstrating that housewives who agreed to a five-minute telephone
interview without payment were more likely to agree to a longer interview than
those who were paid to accede to the first request).
317. See Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 105.
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IV. THE RANDOM SHAREHOLDER COMMITTEE: AN ALTRUISM-
BASED PROPOSAL
Thus far, this article has argued that CEO
compensation in U.S. public corporations is excessive and
poorly structured, and that this problem stems largely from
the separation of ownership and control and the capture of
boards of directors by management. In addition, the article
has explored altruistic theory, discussing environmental
factors that have been demonstrated empirically to
correlate with helping behavior. Now the article will make a
first attempt at applying altruistic theory to the problem of
CEO compensation. As explained in the introduction, this
section is not intended to put forth a detailed plan of action,
but rather to make some tentative suggestions based on
altruistic theory's insights. The goal is to stimulate
discussion in a new direction on a very old and important
problem. While the proposal hopefully represents an
important first step toward using altruism to shape
preferences in ways that improve corporate governance, the
true measure of this article's success will be whether it
provokes others also to investigate reforms employing an
altruism-based approach.
To apply altruism to the problem of executive
compensation, we must create an environment that will
help directors overcome their own self-interest. The
problems with executive pay stem fundamentally from the
absence of a well-functioning market. For a market to
reflect efficient prices, there must be competition among
self-interested purchasers attempting to secure goods and
services at the lowest cost possible. No such competition
exists in the realm of CEO pay because the purchasers of
the CEO's services-the board of directors-are aligned in
important ways with the CEO.
The board members' self-interest appears to lie not in
seeking the best executive talent for the least money, but
rather in pleasing the existing CEO in order to retain their
own positions. Board members therefore can be expected to
try to satisfy the CEO's compensation desires, rather than
attempting to curtail those desires. Perhaps we can unleash
the power of the market on executive compensation
packages, resulting in far more efficient pay structures and
levels, if we can induce directors to behave altruistically
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toward shareholders, putting shareholders' interests ahead
of their own and negotiating more aggressively with CEOs.
The insights and studies discussed in the preceding
section support the creation of a new entity for every U.S.
public corporation, the Random Shareholders' Committee
("RSC"). RSCs would consist of small groups of small, long-
term shareholders, people who own relatively small
amounts of the company's stock and who have owned at
least some portion of that stock for a substantial period (on
the order of a year). They would be randomly selected and
compensated for their time at a fairly generous daily rate.
The RSC's purpose is to induce altruistic behavior in
the chair of the board's compensation committee by
clarifying the chair's perception of shareholders' needs,
enhancing his or her sense of identification with the
stockholders, boosting his or her sense of responsibility
toward the equity owners, and increasing both the costs of
selfish behavior and the rewards of altruism.
To accomplish these goals, the RSC would meet with
the chair of the compensation committee before the
corporation begins salary negotiations with the CEO. At
this meeting, the compensation committee chair would
present the corporation's financial results in simple,
straightforward terms. The chair would also explain the
committee's initial proposal for the CEO's next
compensation contract. The chair would remain and answer
the RSC's questions regarding both the financial results
and the compensation proposal until the RSC members
were satisfied or until some maximum period for questions
had elapsed.
After the compensation committee and the CEO have
agreed on a compensation package, the chair would again
meet with the RSC to present the package's terms in simple
and clear language and answer the RSC's questions. A
stenographer would transcribe the discussion in both
sessions and publish the transcript on the corporation's web
page. It might also be helpful to include some less
structured social gathering time with the RSC and the
chair of the compensation committee.
Before applying altruistic theory to explain the
potential benefits of the RSC, we must recognize at the
outset that the empirical data available, while voluminous,
is not directly applicable. The studies performed thus far
deal with contexts quite different from the corporate
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boardroom. Typically, these studies involve college students
as subjects.3  Also, these studies generally measure
whether the subjects will bear relatively small costs, and
involve situations where there may be strong social norms
that call for helpfulness. This is a very different
environment from the corporate boardroom, which
generally consists of experienced, successful adults
arguably acculturated to norms of self-interest. Just
because manipulating some environmental factor may
induce college students to build more boxes does not mean
that same factor will induce board members to risk a
prestigious and lucrative position. Nevertheless, while a
great deal of empirical work on the boardroom context
remains to be done, the existing studies should suffice as a
starting place to begin research.
Based on the existing data, the RSC should help induce
altruistic behavior in the chair of the compensation
committee. First, spending several hours with small
shareholders will permit the chair to learn first-hand about
shareholder concerns. Members of the RSC will educate
chairs, grounding them in the real-life problems and
budgets of the middle class and implanting a more realistic
sense of the importance of the money spent on executive
compensation. Hearing about the financial struggles of the
middle class and their needs may serve to remind the chairs
of the enormous opportunity costs involved in richly
compensating executives, and motivate them to attempt to
curtail that compensation and to structure pay packages so
that the corporation gains the maximum possible benefit for
each dollar spent. 19
Second, meeting shareholders will permit the chair to
find common ground, enhancing a sense of identification
with the stockholders and increasing the odds of altruistic
behavior.32 ° Unstructured social time may be particularly
likely to create a sense of identification with shareholders.
Third, singling out a single player in the compensation
process-the chair of the compensation committee-as
accountable to the RSC for the results of the compensation
negotiation should boost that individual's sense of
responsibility toward the equity owners. Feelings of
318. See, e.g., id.; see also BATSON, supra note 32, at 52 and notes 225, 248.
319. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 231-44 and accompanying text.
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responsibility are highly correlated with altruism.321 More
specifically, Rabindra Kanungo and Jay Conger have
argued that business organizations can foster a sense of
responsibility among their officers for their owners and
others in part by assigning specific responsibilities for
altruistic acts. 22 They believe that providing concrete,
detailed instructions on who should be helped and how
lends a sense of competence and certainty to altruistic
behavior and also boosts feelings of self-esteem.323
Finally, publishing the transcript of the RSC's sessions
will increase the cost of selfish behavior and the rewards of
altruism. Publicizing shareholders' opinions that a CEO's
compensation is too high or poorly structured should focus
investors' attention on problems of corporate governance,
perhaps putting pressure on the company's share price. In
addition, greater publicity may exact a price in
embarrassment from overly compliant boards. Conversely,
publicity enhances the social and material rewards for
selfless behavior, exhibiting good corporate governance to
investors and perhaps garnering praise from the business
press resulting in attendant reputation benefits for the
board members. This last argument exhibits some of the
overlap between altruistic theory and the free market
approach. Both schools of thought recognize that cost-
benefit analysis impacts individual behavior, though for
altruistic theory net costs are merely one of many
important variables.324
Several questions immediately arise about the
structure of the RSC. First, why is membership on the
committee limited to small, long-term shareholders?
Second, why are these shareholders selected randomly and
not elected? Third, why limit the RSC's meetings to the
chair of the compensation committee instead of including
the entire committee, the entire board of directors, or even
the CEO? Fourth, will the RSC actually succeed in reducing
and/or restructuring CEO compensation packages? Finally,
if boards are captured by CEOs and CEOs are self-
interested, how will a plan like the RSC ever be
implemented?
321. See supra notes 255-64 and accompanying text.
322. Kanungo & Conger, supra note 32, at 253.
323. Id.
324. See supra notes 281-96 and accompanying text.
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The first question was why membership on the RSC is
limited to small, long-term shareholders. Requiring that
members of the RSC have held some portion of their stock
for a substantial period eliminates those investors-such as
"day traders"-who have only a speculative interest in the
company. Such short-term investors have little incentive to
care about the company's long-term prospects and may
therefore be more likely to accept RSC membership for the
associated fees without working to achieve the RSC's goals.
In fact, speculative investors may have perverse incentives.
Speculators may profit by working against the corporation's
interests, attempting to achieve a short-term decline in the
corporation's stock price to purchase stock cheaply or to
profit from a short position.
While limiting membership to long-term shareholders
likely has implicit appeal, it seems counterintuitive to bar
large institutional shareholders from the RSC. Numerous
scholars have turned to institutional shareholders to solve
the separation of ownership and control dilemma.32 These
commentators have argued that institutional sharehold-
ers-unlike typical small shareholders-have both the
incentive and expertise to monitor corporate executives. By
limiting RSC membership to small stockholders, the article
appears to be guaranteeing that the RSC will lack the
ability to check CEO avarice.
As explained above, however,2 6 while institutional
shareholders may possess the expertise for effective
monitoring, they lack the requisite incentive. Because
institutional investors diversify their equity investments,
and because they increasingly employ indexing strategies,
the large sums they invest are divided among a very large
number of companies. As a result, the benefits from close
325. See Black, supra note 104, at 815-16 (advocating that the benefits to
greater institutional investor monitoring outweigh dangers); Conard, supra
note 104, at 176-78 (advocating reforms to facilitate institutional investor
monitoring); Dent, supra note 104, at 882-83 (proposing to grant control of
proxy solicitations to a committee of the corporation's largest shareholders);
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 880 (arguing for having institutional
investors elect professional directors); Lipton, supra note 104, at 63-64
(proposing changes in the tax code to shift institutional investors' focus to the
long-term); cf Vanecko, supra note 104, at 378 (arguing that changes in the
securities laws to facilitate institutional investor activism are not necessary or
advisable, in part because institutional investors are already often successful in
influencing management).
326. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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monitoring seldom exceed the costs. Still, one might argue
that given a very low-cost monitoring mechanism such as
the RSC, large shareholders might well participate. In
addition, because such investors are much more
sophisticated than typical small shareholders, they should
be much more effective in their efforts to rein in executive
salary excesses.
There are two problems with this line of argument.
First, institutional shareholders already meet informally
with management to express their concerns. It seems
unlikely that formalizing such contact-such as by allowing
institutional investors to join or even dominate the RSC-
would greatly enhance monitoring.
Second, far from being more effective monitors than
small shareholders, private institutional investors are
likely to be entirely ineffective in the compensation arena.
As explained above,328 there are several reasons why this is
true. First, private institutional investors often have close
ties to the corporations in which they invest and may seek
business from the same companies whose stock they own.
Rather than risk potentially lucrative new business,
conflicted institutional investors may cheerfully permit
executives to pay themselves exorbitant salaries, reasoning
that the resulting new business easily offsets any loss
suffered by the investor's equity stake.
Also, private institutional investors are themselves
corporations, run by CEOs who desire large compensation
packages. Deflating the market for executive compensation
runs directly counter to these officers' interest because the
more CEOs at comparable corporations receive in
compensation, the easier it will be to justify increases in
salary packages for the heads of institutional investors.
Finally, all institutional investors-even public pension
funds-may be subject to status quo bias. Status quo bias
refers to individuals' tendency to prefer the existing
situation to any proposed change, when all else is equal.3
327. See EISENBERG, supra note 89, at 122-23.
328. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate
Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2002) ("[A]n increasing body of
empirical and experimental evidence demonstrates... [that] the maximum
amount a nonowner would be willing to pay for an entitlement is often
significantly less than the minimum amount she would demand to part with it
if she initially owned it."); Jolls et al., supra note 27, at 27 (discussing the
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For example, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and
Richard H. Thaler demonstrated in a series of experiments
that subjects given inexpensive objects such as mugs or
chocolate bars instantly increased their valuation of those
objects.3" Institutional investors, accustomed to high CEO
compensation packages, may have difficulty envisioning
radical changes in either the magnitude or structure of
those packages. While small shareholders are not often
financially sophisticated, they can be expected to possess a
strong sense of the importance of parsimony that board
members, CEOs, and institutional investors, accustomed to
dealing with seven to ten digit figures, may lack.
Nevertheless, the risk of status quo bias may be outweighed
by the benefits of greater sophistication for public pension
funds, if not for private institutional investors. This
question requires further study.
These arguments may explain why the RSC's members
might be small, long-term shareholders, but that brings us
to the second question: why must the members be randomly
selected? The ideals of shareholder democracy would seem
to be better served by electing the RSC's members.
Elections might also protect the corporation at least to some
degree from selecting RSC members who are incompetent
or irresponsible.
The problem with elections is that they have proven
largely ineffective as a counterweight to management's
power. As explained above,331 despite being elected by
endowment effect); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONONOMICS,
supra note 27, at 213-28 (reporting results of experiments supporting the
endowment effect's existence);
An unusually rich body of behavioral science literature demon-
strates.., that individuals often place a higher monetary value on
items they own than on those that they do not own. Because the
consequence of this effect is that people place a higher value on their
endowments than on other items, this phenomenon is often referred to
as the "endowment effect."
Russell Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1107-
13 (2000); Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and
Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 27, at 116 ("[T]he
initital allocation of legal entitlements can affect preferences for those
entitlements."). I am indebted to Russell Korobkin for the idea of applying the
notion of status quo bias to this problem.
330. See Kahneman et al., supra note 329, at 225.
331. See supra Part II.
884 [Vol. 51
SOFTENING PHARAOH'S HEART
shareholders, directors have not advocated consistently for
shareholder interests. Instead, boards of directors have
generally deferred to management's decisions both in
matters of general business strategy and in narrower
questions of management self-interest, such as executive
compensation.332 Many of the causes of this deference stem
from management's influence over the selection process."'
Board member candidates are nominated by the existing
board. 34 To the extent that management controls the
existing board, it also determines who is nominated to fill
board vacancies. As a result, critical board members are
rarely nominated, and, when nominated and elected, are
rarely nominated for a second term.335
The same problem would likely recur if RSC members
were elected. If RSC candidates were selected by the board,
then management's influence would likely permeate the
process, giving shareholders no real choice but to elect
compliant members. Institutional investors could be
permitted to nominate candidates as well, but for the same
reasons that institutional shareholders are themselves
unlikely to oppose management interests in the
compensation arena, they are unlikely to select proxies to
do so.336 Moreover, even if "opposition" candidates could
somehow be nominated-perhaps by a coalition of public
pension funds-shareholders would be unlikely to elect
them. Shareholders have demonstrated a remarkably
consistent history of voting for management proposals, even
when they seem clearly against shareholder interests.337
Management compensation plans almost always pass by
332. See id.
333. See supra Part II(A).
334. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
336. But see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 883-88 (arguing for
professional directors hired by institutional shareholders).
337. See Barris, supra note 45, at 98 ("[Of the more than one thousand
resolutions advanced by corporate management... during the 1992 proxy
season, only seven failed to pass."); Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter,
Judicial Schizophrenia In Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REV. 485, 514
(1994) (noting that in 1993, out of 400 governance proposals at 225 companies,
eleven received a majority vote); John Wasik, Speak Loudly--Or Lose Your Big
Stick, FIN. TIMES, July 24, 2002 (USA ed2), at P26 ("Showing meager but
growing success, only 13 shareholder proposals out of 712 resolutions filed in
the past year by fund managers earned more than 20 per cent support from
other corporate shareholders, the SAN reports.").
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large margins, even when they seem excessive.38 Random
selection presents a promising method of purging pro-
management influences from the selection process.
The third question of why the RSC should meet only
with the chair of the compensation committee, and not the
entire committee, is somewhat easier to answer. Studies
indicate that a sense of responsibility for the person in need
heightens the likelihood of altruistic behavior.339  For
example, a witness to an accident is more likely to assist
the victim when there are no other bystanders than when
many others also saw the accident. 4 ° Similarly, the chair of
the compensation committee should feel more responsible
for helping the shareholders-and should therefore be more
likely to exhibit helping behavior-if the chair is the only
director present at the RSC meeting than if the entire
committee attends. Also, the RSC members, who will
mostly be unfamiliar with corporate settings, may be
somewhat intimidated at the prospect of facing an entire
committee of board members. Outnumbering the committee
chair by eight or more to one should hearten the RSC
members considerably, encouraging more outspoken,
assertive behavior.
If the RSC proves effective in inducing altruistic
behavior, why not go straight to the source? In other words,
why not have the CEO meet with the RSC? CEOs after all,
already possess a great deal of power over their boards,
338. See Warren F. Grienenberger, Institutional Investors And Corporate
Governance, in 2 PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 315, 322
(Klaus Eppler ed., 1996) (noting that no plans for director pensions have been
defeated when put to a shareholder vote); E. Scott Reckard, Vote Urges BofA
Curb on Severance Compensation: Measure Seeking Limit for Execs is Passed by
Shareholders with 51% Margin. Bank's Board Can Reject Request, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2002 at C1 (noting that although Bank of America shareholders passed
a resolution asking the board to limit severance pay for executives, the 13
similar severance measures tracked by the Investor Responsibility Research
Center during the previous year received an average of only 32% of shareholder
votes); Richard H. Wagner, Obtaining Shareholder Approval of Stock Plans, 11
INSIGHTS No. 12, at 15 (Dec. 1997) ("Without urging, record holders historically
have not participated in the voting process in overwhelming numbers, but when
they have, their support of management's stock plan proposals is extremely
high, absent any high profile compensation or performance issues.").
339. See supra notes 255-64 and accompanying text.
340. See Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 73; Schwartz, supra note 32, at 256




particularly in regard to their own compensation plans.34' If
we can engender altruism in CEOs the compensation
problem may prove much more malleable. In addition, there
may be indirect benefits to such altruism. CEOs feeling
altruistic toward shareholders may also work harder and
focus more on long-term appreciation of both share price
and dividends, rather than focusing narrowly on short-term
swings that will boost their own compensation under
current pay structures.
Despite the potential advantages associated with more
altruistic CEOs, the lower expected benefit of having CEOs
meet with the RSCs seems to argue against involving them
in the process. CEOs' interests are far more directly
opposed to the RSCs' agenda than are directors'. For CEOs,
what is at stake is their primary source of income. A small
percentage decrease in salary or benefits may translate to a
large absolute sum. Similarly, small changes in the
compensation packages' structures may increase CEOs' risk
substantially if the new rules better correlate pay to
performance. In contrast, while directors may risk their
board seats by asking the CEO for pay concessions,
membership on a board of directors is a sideline, not a
primary occupation. The costs attendant to a director's
losing his or her board seat may therefore be significantly
lower than for a CEO acceding to changes in his or her
compensation package, and the likelihood of helping
behavior commensurately higher. Nevertheless, involving
CEOs may ultimately prove beneficial and should be
explored further.
In addition to these structural critiques, there remains
an additional crucial objection that the RSC must overcome.
The fourth question to be addressed is whether the RSC
will have any impact on executive salaries' magnitude or
structure. In other words, will the RSC really work? This
query can be broken down into two subsidiary questions.
First, is altruism too weak a force to blunt the powerful
self-interest inherent in directors' desire to safeguard their
positions? Second, can shareholder members of the RSC act
as effective advocates, or will they passively accede to the
CEO's desires as transmitted by the compensation
committee chair?
341. See supra Part II(D).
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The first point is effectively a restatement of the
widespread skepticism raised whenever altruism is
juxtaposed with questions of corporate governance.
Although most of us will readily concede that altruism of
some sort exists, many will argue that behavior that
appears altruistic is really just a result of enlightened self-
interest. For example, Eric Posner contends that gift giving
is often motivated not by a desire for the well-being of the
recipient but rather an attempt to signal to others that the
giver has a low discount rate and can therefore be trusted
as a contracting partner.342 Even those who believe in
selfless altruism may doubt its efficacy and durability. As
even Batson, the leading proponent of the existence of
empathy-driven altruism, has written, "[A]ltruistic
motivation that blossoms from feeling empathy may be a
fragile flower, easily crushed by overriding egoistic
concerns."
343
But recall that we do not require empathy-driven
altruism for this proposal to work; egoistic altruism may
function just as well for our purposes. Our concern is with
the expressed behavior, not the motivation for that
behavior. Numerous studies, some of which were discussed
above ,3' indicate that factors such as clear perception of
need, sense of responsibility, and personality traits enhance
the odds of altruistic behavior. The RSC, which is designed
to utilize these factors, may therefore enhance altruism.
In addition, executive compensation decisions involve
very high stakes, sometimes amounting to hundreds of
millions of dollars. The RSC should not prove very
expensive to run. For example, if a dozen RSC members
were paid $1000 per day, and the entire process required
four days of their time, their total compensation would
amount to $48,000. Even accounting for travel, food,
lodging, and the value of the time of the chair of the
compensation committee, it is difficult to imagine the RSC's
cost exceeding $100,000. 345 Yet if the RSC succeeds in
reducing average CEO pay by only 10%, the corporation
will save an average of $1.1 million per year. This benefit is
342. See POSNER, supra note 193, at 49-62.
343. BATSON, supra note 32, at 125-26.
344. See supra Part III(B).
345. Personality testing should be even cheaper. Personality testing
requires the services of a single psychologist for a few hours. Testing a dozen
board members should not amount to more than a few thousand dollars.
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magnified if CEO salary negotiations occur only every few
years, since the benefits accrue each year but the
corporation would only bear the RSC's cost during
negotiation years.
Moreover, the RSC's benefits may go beyond the gross
reduction in total compensation. The RSC's involvement in
the process may also yield pay packages that are better
structured to induce optimal CEO behavior. Also, altruistic
sentiments initiated by the RSC may carry over into the
board's functions more generally. Some researchers have
argued that altruistic models enhance altruistic behavior in
others."6
As for the second challenge, the demands on
shareholder members of the RSC would be relatively
minimal. Shareholders would not need to be
confrontational. In fact, a hostile, aggressive RSC might
undermine efforts to improve directors' feelings of
identification with and affection for shareholders. RSC
members' primary role would be to ask common sense
questions and to familiarize the chair with their concerns
and perspectives. Members would not be expected to
possess the expertise of an accountant or lawyer; they
would not need to understand the intricacies of corporate
finance to be effective. The important points for the RSC
would be the corporation's performance relative to its
competitors and compared to its own past, the amount the
CEO is to be compensated, and the relationship between
CEO compensation and corporate performance. Most
shareholders should be capable of understanding these
points, at least on a surface level.
The final question concerns implementation. There are
many ways a plan such as the RSC could be implemented,
including voluntary adoption by individual boards,
shareholder proposals, new rules by the stock exchanges,
and mandatory state or federal regulations or statutes. It is
premature at this stage to suggest any particular
implementation method. The theoretical arguments
described above in favor of the RSC require more direct
empirical support before even voluntary adoption of the
proposal can be firmly recommended. Mandatory regulation
346. See Kanungo & Conger, supra note 32, at 253 ("Individuals tend to




should demand even greater evidence supporting the RSC's
effectiveness. This article, therefore, has confined the
discussion to evaluating the likelihood that the RSC will
succeed based on the empirical data already available on
altruism, delaying any detailed discussion of
implementation until more direct studies indicate that
implementation would be advisable.
CONCLUSION
Although there are these theoretical reasons to think
these devices will be effective, there remains plenty of room
for doubt. CEOs are known for being tough-minded and can
be expected to be resistant to any manipulations. Why
should they give up their pay just to please a handful of
small shareholders? Since board members such as the
compensation committee chair have historically proven to
be captured by the CEO due to a number of factors, such as
their incentive to maintain their board membership and the
relatively low impact of CEO compensation on the bottom
line, the chair may prove equally resistant to the RSC.
In addition, directors may honestly believe-and
perhaps be able to persuade the RSC-that their duty to
the shareholders demands that they not antagonize the
CEO over an issue that may turn out to be of subsidiary
importance to the company. Strengthening board members'
altruism toward shareholders would not be expected to
affect this dynamic.
These concerns are well-founded. But there are also
many reasons to think the devices will be effective, at least
some of the time. CEOs may cooperate with efforts to
reduce or restructure their compensation somewhat in
order to make themselves feel good. Cooperation seems
particularly likely if any reduction is insufficient to affect
their lifestyle materially, for example from $11 million to
$10 million. Alternatively, CEOs may agree to a
restructuring that better correlates pay with performance.
Such concessions will also help CEOs appear benevolent
and public-spirited, boosting their own and the company's
image. A willing CEO would eliminate directors' incentives
to resist attempts to lower or restructure CEO
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compensation, by cutting the tie between such efforts and
risks of termination.347
These questions cannot be resolved through theoretical
speculation or by reference to indirect studies. Clearly
empirical research is called for. Ideally, such research
would consist of direct experimentation, persuading a
random sample of corporations to adopt the proposal and
measuring any resultant change in compensation
magnitude and structure. Since corporations appear
unlikely to adopt these reforms at this early stage of
research, however, a useful interim step would be to design
studies that model corporate structures and examine the
effect of these devices on subjects placed in positions
analogous to those of corporate directors and CEOs.
Hopefully this article will prompt others to take up this
research and attempt to realize the enormous promise of
altruistic theory for corporate governance.
347. Note, however, that the possibility of the CEO cooperating with this
process also raises the specter of collusion between the CEO and the chair of the
compensation committee. They could agree to inflate the initial compensation
proposal in the chair's presentation to the RSC, planning to reduce the package
to its original level (or replace its original structure) during the RSC process in
order to appear altruistic. The success of such efforts to "game" the RSC process
would depend on the failure of the RSC to induce the chair to behave
altruistically. Obviously, such gaming can by no means be described as bearing
any kind of a cost for the benefit of another. Whether chairs subject to the RSC
process would consent to participate in efforts to manipulate it is an empirical
question in need of investigation.
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